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Plain Meaning, 
Precedent, and 
Metaphysics: 
Interpreting the 
“Point Source” 
Element of the 
Clean Water Act 
Offense
by Jeffrey G . Miller
Jeffrey G . Miller is Professor Emeritus, Pace Law School .
Summary
This Article, the fourth in a series of five, examines 
the continuing struggles to define “point source” 
and “nonpoint source” under the Clean Water Act . 
State regulation of nonpoint sources is neither perva-
sive nor robust, and most continuing water pollution 
problems can be traced primarily to nonpoint sources . 
EPA should define nonpoint sources by regulation 
and begin to expand the definition of point source by 
incorporating established case law and Agency prac-
tice to bring more nonpoint sources into the point 
source definition .
I. Introduction
Clean Water Act (CWA)1 §301(a) prohibits “the discharge 
of any pollutant by any person” unless in compliance 
with several listed sections .2 The listed sections authorize 
the issuance of two types of CWA permits3 and specify 
their substantive requirements . Section 502(12) defines 
“discharge of a pollutant” to mean “any addition of any 
pollutant to navigable waters from any point source .”4 In 
sum, the subsection prohibits (1) any addition (2) of any 
pollutant (3) to navigable waters (4) from any point source 
(5) by any person except in compliance with a CWA per-
mit .5 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has called this the 
CWA’s “core command .”6
This Article, the fourth in a series of five, examines how 
the U .S . Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the 
courts have interpreted the meaning of the term “point 
source,” the fourth jurisdictional element of the water pol-
lution control offense . In the CWA, “point source” is an 
artificial construct with a statutory definition, followed by 
lists of examples and exclusions . Disputes over the interpre-
tations of the statutory term have produced a steady stream 
of reported decisions since the initial implementation of 
the statute in 1979 . Even after four decades, many of these 
issues are unresolved and new issues continue to arise .
1 . 33 U .S .C . §§1251-1387, ELR Stat . FWPCA §§101-607 . The basic con-
tours of the statute were established in the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act Amendments of 1972, Oct . 18, 1972, Pub . L . No . 92-500, 86 Stat . 
816 .
2 . 33 U .S .C . §1311(a) .
3 . The U .S . Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issues permits under 
CWA §402, 33 U .S .C . §1342, to regulate the discharge of pollutants; the 
U .S . Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) issues permits under CWA 
§404, 33 U .S .C . §1344, to regulate the filling of wetlands .
4 . 33 U .S .C . §1362(12) .
5 . Three earlier articles in ELR News & Analysis focused individually on the 
§301(a) water pollution control offense elements “addition,” “pollutant,” 
and “navigable waters .” See Jeffrey G . Miller, Plain Meaning, Precedent, 
and Metaphysics: Interpreting the “Addition” Element of the Clean Water Act 
Offense, 44 ELR 10770 (Sept . 2014); Jeffrey G . Miller, Plain Meaning, 
Precedent, and Metaphysics: Interpreting the “Pollutant” Element of the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Offense, 44 ELR 10960 (Nov . 2014); and Jeffrey G . 
Miller, Plain Meaning, Precedent, and Metaphysics: Interpreting the “Navi-
gable Waters” Element of the Clean Water Act Offense, 45 ELR 10548 (June 
2015) .
6 . Coeur Alaska, Inc . v . Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U .S . 
261, 298, 39 ELR 20133 (2009) . The author has elsewhere called it “the 
basic prohibition” of the CWA . Jeffrey G . Miller et al ., Introduction 
to Environmental Law: Cases and Materials on Water Pollution 
Control 141 (2008) .
Author’s Note: The author thanks Laura Young, Pace 2015, for her 
extensive research and analysis that form the background of this 
Article and her discussions with me of the issues it analyzes. She was 
a delight to work with.
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II. Congressional Action: The Statutory 
Definition and Legislative History of 
Point Source
A. Statutory Definition
Section 502(14) of the CWA provides that:
“[P]oint source” means any discernible, confined and 
discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any 
pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fis-
sure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feed-
ing operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which 
pollutants are or may be discharged . This term does not 
include agricultural discharges and return flows from irri-
gated agriculture .7
The definition of point source is the most grammati-
cally complex of the elements’ statutory definitions . It has 
a compound structure beginning with the definition, a 
“discernible, confined and discrete conveyance”; followed 
by an inclusive list of 12 examples; and ending with two 
exceptions . The comparative structural complexity of the 
point source definition reflects that, unlike the other ele-
ments, it is a statutory construct with no meaning apart 
from its statutory definition . Before the enactment of the 
CWA, “addition” and “pollutant” each had plain mean-
ings and “navigable waters” had both a plain and a legal 
meaning . However, while both “point” and “source” had 
plain meanings before enactment of the CWA, their com-
bination into one term did not have a preexisting plain 
meaning . “Point” in its most pertinent definition means 
“a particular spot, place, or position in an area or on a 
map, object or surface”; and “source” in its most pertinent 
definition means “a place, person or thing from which 
something comes or can be obtained .”8 Significantly, these 
two words, alone or together, do not suggest a “discernible, 
confined and discrete conveyance,” the statutory definition 
of “point source .”
The other elements are on/off switches, determining 
whether a discharge is regulated by the CWA in one of its 
two permit programs . If a discharge lacks an “addition,” 
a “pollutant,” or a “navigable water,” the CWA does not 
regulate the discharge, regardless of whether it is through 
a “point source .” By contrast, “point source” is a switch 
that shuttles discharges between different CWA schemes . 
If a discharge meets the other elements and is through a 
“point source,” it is regulated by one of the CWA’s two 
permit programs . If a discharge meets the other elements 
but is not through a “point source,” it may be regulated 
by the CWA’s nonpoint source program . While the CWA 
does not mention non-additions, non-pollutants, or non-
navigable waters, it does mention “nonpoint sources”9 and 
provides for programs regulating them . Despite the impor-
7 . 33 U .S .C . §1362(14) .
8 . Oxford English Dictionary, www .oxforddictionaries .com .
9 . CWA §§105(d)(1), 201(c), 208(b)(2)(F), 319(a) & (b); 33 U .S .C . 
§§1255(d)(1), 1281(c), 1288(b)(2)(F), 1239(a) & (b) .
tance of nonpoint sources to the structure of the statute and 
to understanding the term point source, the statute does 
not define nonpoint source . Nor does EPA define nonpoint 
source in its permit program regulations, although it does 
so in informal documents .10
Although the U .S . Congress did not define “point” or 
“source” generally, it defined “source” for the limited pur-
pose of CWA §306,11 the section requiring EPA to estab-
lish technology-based standards for new sources .12 Section 
306(a)(3) defines a source as a building or facility from 
which pollutants originate . This “source” is a new manufac-
turing facility, not a point source—that is, a new discharge 
pipe leading from the facility to navigable water .13 This 
makes sense, for new sources are subject to higher levels of 
pollution control than are existing sources . It is easier and 
cheaper for new sources to design and build facilities with 
state-of-the-art pollution control than for existing sources 
to retrofit existing facilities with it, particularly since new 
facilities can often be designed to use less water and hazard-
ous materials, thus generating less pollutants to treat . The 
same rationale would not apply if the newly constructed 
source was merely the pipe that carries pollutants from 
the facility to navigable water . Thus, “source” in both the 
dictionary definition and in the limited CWA definition 
of “new source” connotes the origin of pollutants . “Point 
source,” on the other hand, connotes the conveyance of 
pollutants from their origin to their addition to navigable 
water . In other words, point source is the place of the addi-
tion of pollutants to navigable water rather than the origin 
of the pollutants .14 When we interpret point source, we are 
not searching for the plain meaning of “point,” “source,” or 
“point source,” but for the plain meanings of “discernible,” 
“confined,” “discrete,” “conveyance,” “pipe,” “tunnel,” or 
other words used in the statutory definition of the term . 
Indeed, the plain meaning of “source” obscures the con-
gressional definition of “point source .”
If the definition of point source was straightforward 
and clear, the statute’s failure to define point, source, and 
nonpoint source would pose no problems . Unfortunately, 
on close reading, the definition is far from clear . First, it 
defines a point source as a conveyance “from which pollut-
ants are or may be discharged .” This makes the definition 
circular, because the CWA in turn defines “discharge” as 
any addition of any pollutant by any point source . Second, 
it defines point source as a conveyance, but lists a concen-
trated animal feeding operation (CAFO) as an example of 
a point source, although a CAFO is not a typical convey-
ance . Instead, a CAFO is an agricultural facility more like 
10 . 40 C .F .R . §122 .2 .
11 . 33 U .S .C . §1316 .
12 . CWA §306(a)(3), 33 U .S .C . §1316(a)(3) .
13 . Mahelona v . Hawaiian Elec . Co ., Inc ., 418 F . Supp . 1328, 1334-35, 7 ELR 
20031 (D . Haw . 1976) .
14 . South Fla . Water Mgmt . Dist . v . Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U .S . 95, 
105, 34 ELR 20021 (2004) . The definition of point source “makes it plain 
that a point source need not be the original source of the pollutant’; it need 
only convey the pollutant to ‘navigable waters .’” Id. See also United States v . 
Lucas, 516 F .3d 316, 332-33, 38 ELR 20041 (5th Cir . 2008); Dague v . City 
of Burlington, 935 F .2d 1343, 1354, 21 ELR 21133 (2d Cir . 1991) .
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an industrial facility than a conveyance . Third, the two 
statutory exceptions contained in the definition, “agri-
cultural stormwater discharges” and “return flows from 
irrigated agriculture,” are not conveyances either; instead, 
they are liquids that are or may be conveyed . Without the 
exemptions, they would not be point sources . The internal 
inconsistencies suggest that: (1) Congress did not (and per-
haps could not) clearly articulate the distinction between 
point source and nonpoint source; (2) Congress intended 
some agricultural discharges to be regulated by the CWA’s 
permit programs and intended other agricultural dis-
charges not to be regulated by the permit programs; and 
(3)  determining which agricultural discharges are point 
sources will be a major issue in interpreting “point source .”
The failure of Congress to define nonpoint sources15 is 
particularly troublesome because its apparent meaning is 
anything other than a point source . But does that mean 
a nonconveyance or a conveyance that is indiscernible, 
unconfined, and indiscrete? As used in the legislative his-
tory of the CWA, and as commonly used when discussing 
water pollution, nonpoint sources are discharges of storm-
water . The two are not synonymous, however . Stormwa-
ter may be collected and channeled by human activity, 
in which case it is discharged by a point source .16 On the 
other hand, there are nonpoint sources that have nothing 
to do with stormwater .17
These inconsistencies help explain the difficulties that 
courts and EPA have encountered in construing point 
source and the frequent conflation by the courts, EPA, 
and litigants of that element with other elements of the 
CWA offense18 and even with other CWA terms that are 
15 . Cordiano v . Metacon Gun Club, Inc ., 575 F .3d 199, 219 (2d Cir . 2009) .
16 . EPA’s definition of “discharge of pollutants,” for instance, specifically in-
cludes stormwater that is collected and channeled by man . 40 C .F .R . 
§122 .2 .
17 . Examples held to be nonpoint sources that have nothing to do with storm-
water include, for example, people and animals .
18 . For conflation with “addition,” see, e .g ., National Cotton Council, v. U.S. 
EPA, 553 F .3d 927, 938-39, 39 ELR 20006 (6th Cir . 2009) (EPA errone-
ously argued that a pesticide spray bar cannot be a point source because 
it did not add pollutants to water, i .e ., it did not spray excess pesticides); 
Peconic Baykeeper, Inc. v. Suffolk Cnty., 600 F .3d 180, 188, 40 ELR 20098 
(2d Cir . 2010) (district court erroneously held spray bar was not a point 
source because it added pesticide to air rather than to water); Dague, 935 
F .2d at 1354 (the losing party erroneously argued that a culvert could not 
be a point source because it did not add a pollutant to navigable water for 
the first time); National Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 Fd .2d 156, 165, 13 
ELR 20015 (D .C . Cir . 1982) (EPA erroneously argued that a dam was not 
a point source because it did not add pollutants from the outside world) . 
For conflation with “navigable waters,” see, e .g ., Rapanos v. United States, 
547 U .S . 715, 735, 36 ELR 20116 (2006) (ditches may sometimes, but 
not often, be both point sources and navigable waters); National Ass’n of 
Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 699 F . Supp . 2d 209, 215-17, 
40 ELR 20104 (D .D .C . 2010) (the losing party erroneously argued that a 
ditch cannot be navigable water because it is a point source) . For conflation 
with “pollutant,” see, e .g ., National Cotton Council, 553 F .3d at 938-39 
(EPA erroneously argued that a pesticide spray bar was not a point source 
because it did not spray pollutants, but instead only a consumer product: 
pesticides); United States v. West Indies Transp., Inc., 127 F .3d 299, 309, 28 
ELR 20202 (3d Cir . 1997) (the defendant erroneously argued that a barge 
could not be a point source because the barge was a pollutant when parts 
of it were torn off and thrown into the water) . For conflation with “by any 
person,” see, e .g ., United States v. Plaza Health Labs., Inc., 3 F .3d 643, 647, 
23 ELR 21526 (2d Cir . 1993) (a person cannot be included in the fourth 
not elements of the offense .19 Conflation also results from 
the fact that the elements (all nouns) are all linked by 
prepositions . Some courts have even treated the preposi-
tions as elements .20
B. Legislative History of Point Source
The U .S . House of Representatives and the U .S . Senate 
bills both used “point source” in the definition of “dis-
charge of a pollutant” and defined point source identically, 
except that the House version included “from which there 
is or may be a thermal discharge .”21 The omission of ther-
mal discharges from the enacted “point source” definition 
is of no significance, however, because §502(6) defines 
“pollutant” to include “heat .” Moreover, CWA §316(a)22 
provides specific regulation for thermal discharges in the 
§402 permit program . Nothing in the House, Senate, or 
Conference Reports further explains the meanings of point 
source, nonpoint source, the differences between the two 
terms, or why the permit programs are limited to point 
sources . Some comments made during the floor debates 
address these issues, but the comments are no less confus-
ing than the statutory definition of point source .
Sen . Edmund Muskie (D-Me .), the chief sponsor of the 
Senate bill, on which most of the statute is based, attempted 
to illuminate the distinction between point source and 
nonpoint source:
The discharge standard applies to point source control . 
Agricultural runoff is one form of agricultural activity 
that is a nonpoint source . It is a runoff into water that 
occurs perhaps miles away from the land that adjoins it . 
There is no effective way, as yet other than land use con-
trol, by which you can intercept that runoff and control 
it in the way that you do a point source . We have not yet 
developed technology to deal with that kind of problem . 
We need to find ways to deal with it, because a great quan-
tity of pollutants is discharged by runoff, not only from 
agriculture but from construction sites, from streets, from 
parking lots, and so on, and we have to be concerned with 
developing controls for them .23
element, “point source,” because person is already included in the fifth ele-
ment, “by any person”) .
19 . It is relatively common for courts, EPA, and commentators to distinguish 
between point source pollution and nonpoint source pollution . See, e.g., 
League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v . 
Forsgren, 309 F .3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir . 2002) (“The issue before us is 
whether spraying insecticide from an aircraft  .  .  . is point source pollution 
or nonpoint source pollution .”); Gorsuch, 693 F .2d at 156 (“the point or 
nonpoint character of pollution is established when the pollutant first en-
ters navigable water”) . This conflates point source with pollution . Although 
“pollution” is defined in §502(19), 33 U .S .C . §1362(19), it is not an ele-
ment of the CWA §301(a) offense . Indeed, it is quite distinguishable from 
“pollutant,” which is an element .
20 . “From” was treated as an element or close to it in Peconic Baykeeper, 600 
F .3d at 188-90; Gorsuch, 693 F .2d at 174-75 .
21 . H .R . 11896, §502(15), H . Rep . No . 92-911, Nov . 19, 1971 . See also S . 
2770, §502(p), S . Rep . No . 92-414, Oct . 28, 1971 .
22 . 33 U .S .C . §1316(a) .
23 . 117 Cong . Rec . 38805 (Nov . 2, 1971), reprinted in 2 A Legislative His-
tory of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 
[hereinafter 2 Legis . History], available at http://catalog .hathitrust .org/
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The “discharge standard” to which Senator Muskie 
referred is the set of uniform national technology-based 
standards that the CWA required EPA to promulgate for 
industrial and municipal point sources under §§301(b), 
304(b)-(d), and 306 .24 His statement does not draw a crisp 
line between point sources and nonpoint sources and does 
not define nonpoint sources . Nevertheless, it makes several 
suggestions that may be useful in dealing with the point 
source/nonpoint source distinction . First, point sources 
typically are susceptible to pollution control by end-of-pipe 
technology using uniform national standards, while non-
point sources typically are not .25 Instead, nonpoint sources 
are usually susceptible to land use and management con-
trols, which are typically site-specific .26 Second, nonpoint 
sources are associated with stormwater runoff . Third, agri-
cultural stormwater runoff is typically nonpoint source-
related . Fourth, nonpoint sources are to a great extent from 
agriculture, construction sites, streets, and parking lots . 
Finally, when Senator Muskie stated that we have “not yet” 
developed technologies to control nonpoint sources and 
“need to,” he suggested that as we gradually develop such 
technologies for different categories of nonpoint sources, 
those categories should become point sources and be regu-
lated by the CWA’s permit program .27
Senator Muskie’s statement raises as many questions as 
it answers . Why cannot runoff be effectively intercepted 
and controlled? We routinely intercept and convey it with 
ditches . Moreover, we can also treat it to remove pollutants . 
The problem is that the great volume of stormwater often 
makes treatment not cost effective . His assertion that non-
point sources are associated with runoff reminds us that 
flows are not conveyances, the exceptions in the definition 
of point source notwithstanding . His assertion that non-
point sources are specifically associated with agricultural 
runoff is inconsistent with the definition’s inclusion of 
CAFOs in its list of examples of point sources . What does 
the third sentence mean? Stormwater runoff will not flow 
uncounted miles to a stream . Instead, it will percolate into 
the ground, evaporate into the air, or flow into the closest 
Record/001515679 (statement of Senator Muskie also available at http://
abacus .bates .edu/muskie-archives/ajcr/1971/CWA%20Beall%20Query .
shtml) .
24 . 33 U .S .C . §§1311(b), 1314(b)-(d) .
25 . Pollutants discharged from nonpoint sources can be controlled by end-of-
pipe technology . The polluted water flowing from many nonpoint sources 
can be collected and treated, such as stormwater runoff in municipal storm 
sewers . But such collection and treatment may be very expensive because of 
the large volumes involved . For the same reason, treatment of stormwaters 
to the same levels as treatment of municipal sewage may not be economical-
ly feasible . Management techniques may lower pollutant levels at less cost, 
such as street sweeping, retention ponds for parking lot runoff, green roofs, 
minimizing paved-over areas, and making paving less impervious .
26 . Permits for point sources generally incorporate effluent limitations reflect-
ing technology-based standards or water quality standards, rather than land 
use or management controls . Nonetheless, they may use best management 
practices to control runoff from factories, spills, and raw material storage 
areas . CWA §304(e) . Moreover, industries must control runoff from areas 
where it comes into contact with industrial pollutants . CWA §402(p) .
27 . One court declared it clear from the legislative history that Congress “would 
have regulated so-called nonpoint sources if a workable method could have 
been derived .” United States v . Earth Sciences, Inc ., 599 F .2d 368, 373, 9 
ELR 20542 (10th Cir . 1979) .
remote tributary of the stream . Perhaps, the senator had in 
mind the suggestion by Rep . Teno Roncalio (D-Wyo .) in 
the context of irrigation return flows, rather than storm-
water, that “[i]t is virtually impossible to trace pollutants 
to specific irrigation lands, making these pollutants a 
nonpoint source in most cases .”28 Irrigation canals often 
flow for miles between many irrigated farms, accumulat-
ing silt, fertilizer, pesticides, and other pollutants from all 
of them, so that when the much-reused irrigation water is 
eventually discharged to navigable water, it is difficult if 
not impossible to trace specific pollutants in the discharge 
back to particular farms . But Representative Roncalio’s 
statement is not particularly helpful either; the definition 
of point source does not mention or suggest traceability .29 
Moreover, while it may be impossible to determine from 
a sample taken at the discharge of an irrigation ditch or 
canal what pollutants particular farms contributed to the 
discharge, it is quite possible to make that determination 
by sampling where the irrigation water is diverted to and 
discharged from each farm . It may also be possible to iden-
tify fertilizers and pesticides in a discharge by chemically 
fingerprinting them to fertilizers and pesticides used on 
particular farms .
Sen . Robert Dole (R-Kan .) reiterated the nonpoint 
nature of agricultural pollution . “Very simply,” he stated 
(unknowingly ironic, as we shall see below), a nonpoint 
source of pollution is one that “does not confine its pol-
luting discharge to one fairly specific location, such as a 
sewer pipe, a drainage ditch, or a conduit . In the area of 
agricultural pollution, a feedlot would generally be consid-
ered to be a nonpoint source as would pesticide and fertil-
izer runoff and accumulation .”30 It is not clear whether he 
is making a distinction based on the difference between 
point sources and nonpoint sources or on the difference 
between agricultural pollutants, such as pesticide and fer-
tilizer runoff, and other pollutants . His observation that 
feedlots are nonpoint sources is demonstratively incor-
rect . CAFOs are included in the §502(14) list of examples 
of point sources . Perhaps, Senator Dole was alluding to 
smaller CAFOs . Senator Muskie commented that natu-
ral runoff from small CAFOs is not a point source, unless 
either the CAFO raises more than specified numbers of 
animals or is traversed by a stream .31 If the CAFO is tra-
versed by a stream, it is easy to understand how it conveys 
animal waste to the stream and it therefore could be a point 
source . If, however, a stream does not traverse the CAFO, 
28 . 118 Cong . Rec . 10765 (Mar . 29, 1972), reprinted in 1 A Legislative His-
tory of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 
[hereinafter 1 Legis . History], available at http://catalog .hathitrust .org/
Record/001515679 .
29 . But see League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mountain Biodiversity Project 
v . Forsgren, 309 F .3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir . 2002) (nonpoint sources “are 
identified by three characteristics,” including “(2) The pollutants discharged 
are not traceable to any distinct or identifiable facility .  .  .  .”) .
30 . 2 Legis . History 1294; also included in his supplemental views published 
with S . Rep . No . 92-404, pp . 98-99 (1971), reprinted in 2 Legis . History 
1513-14 .
31 . 2 Legis . History 1299 . “1,000 beef cattle; 700 dairy cows; 290,000 broiler 
chickens; 180,000 laying hens, etc .” In its regulatory definition of a CAFO, 
EPA copied this “poop equivalency table .” 40 C .F .R . §122 .23 .
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it is more difficult to understand how the CAFO is a con-
veyance of the waste, as opposed to the source of the waste . 
In either event, the statute does not distinguish between 
small and large CAFOs, although EPA’s regulations do .32 
So much for Senator Dole’s “very simply .”
Senators Dole and Muskie entered into a colloquy on 
the Senate floor that reiterated many of these points . Sena-
tor Dole asked “to what sort of guidance are we to look for 
further clarification of the terms ‘point source’ and ‘non-
point source’—especially as related to agriculture?” Sena-
tor Muskie replied that such guidance
will be provided in regulations and guidelines of the 
[EPA] Administrator . The present policy with respect to 
the identification of agricultural point sources is generally 
as follows:
First . If a man-made drainage ditch, flushing system or 
other such device is involved and if measurable waste 
results and is discharged into water, it is considered a 
“point source .”
Second . Natural runoff from confined livestock and poul-
try operations are not considered a “point source” unless 
the following concentrations of animals are exceeded  .  .  .
Third . Any feedlot operation which results in the direct 
discharge of wastes into a stream which traverses the feed-
lot are considered point sources without regard to the 
number of animals involved .33
C. The CWA’s Structure: Point Source/Nonpoint 
Source Distinction
One court has commented that the “disparate treatment 
of discharges from point sources and nonpoint sources is 
an organizational paradigm” of the CWA .34 Examination 
of the CWA’s point source and nonpoint source programs 
may help to better frame the distinction between point 
sources and nonpoint sources .
1. Regulation of Point Sources
Point sources may not add pollutants to navigable waters 
without a §402 or §404 permit . EPA issues §402 permits 
and must approve submitted state programs for permit issu-
ance if they are comparable to the federal program . Section 
402 permits contain effluent limitations based on technol-
ogy-based standards35 and water quality standards .36 The 
U .S . Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) issues §404 per-
mits, although EPA must approve submitted state programs 
32 . 40 C .F .R . §122 .23 . CAFOs are discussed in greater detail below .
33 . 1971 Cong . Rec . 38816 (Nov . 2, 1971), reprinted in 2 Legis . His-
tory 1298-99; also available at http://abacus .bates .edu/muskie-archives/
ajcr/1971/CWA%20Dole%20Query .shtml .
34 . Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v . U .S . Forest Serv ., 550 F .3d 778, 780, 39 
ELR 20297 (9th Cir . 2008) (quoted in Friends of the Everglades v . South 
Fla . Water Mgmt . Dist . 570 F .3d 1210, 1227, 39 ELR 20118 (11th Cir . 
2009) .
35 . CWA §§301(b)(2) & 304(b); 33 U .S .C . §§1311(b)(2) & 1314(b) .
36 . CWA §§303 & 304(a); 33 U .S .C . §§1313 & 1314(a) .
comparable to the federal program for permit issuance in 
all but traditionally navigable waters . Section 404 permits 
authorize the filling of wetlands, with limitations on how 
much of a wetland may be filled and perhaps requiring 
mitigation, such as providing replacement wetlands . EPA 
oversees state administration of §402 programs, may veto 
proposed state permits if they are not in compliance with 
federal requirements, may enforce against violations of 
state-issued permits, and may withdraw approval of state 
§402 programs . EPA similarly oversees Corps and state 
administration of §404 programs . (For brevity, this Article 
refers to EPA actions in developing, issuing, and enforcing 
permits, although such actions may be taken by the Corps 
or by states with EPA-approved programs .)
The most important condition in a §402 permit is that 
the point source cannot discharge pollutants in excess of 
the permit’s effluent limitations (usually expressed numeri-
cally) for each pollutant it regulates . All effluent limita-
tions must require the pollution reduction accomplished 
by the best technology for the particular type of facility 
at issue .37 EPA regulations establish effluent guidelines 
on an industry-by-industry basis that permit writers can 
easily translate into effluent limitations for each regulated 
facility . The effluent guideline regulations are based on the 
best-performing pollution reduction technologies used or 
capable of being used by each category or subcategory of 
industry . However, if that pollution reduction is insuffi-
cient to ensure attainment or maintenance of concentra-
tions or other criteria for pollutants necessary to achieve 
the state designated use of the receiving water, then the 
permit must require greater pollution reduction to achieve 
such water quality standards .38 Permit holders must sample 
and analyze their effluents to determine whether they com-
ply with the effluent limitations in the permits and must 
report the results to EPA and the state, where the reports 
are public information .39 EPA, the state, and private citi-
zens may enforce against violations .40
2. Regulation of Nonpoint Sources
As discussed below, EPA acknowledges that nonpoint 
sources have long been the leading cause of water quality 
problems . Sections 208 and later 31941 encouraged states 
37 . CWA §301(a) specifies criteria for industrial best available control tech-
nology for toxic pollutants, best available control technology for conven-
tional pollutants, and best available control technology for other pollutants . 
Section 306 also specifies criteria for best available control technology for 
new sources . EPA uses these criteria to promulgate regulations by industrial 
categories (for example, the organic chemicals and canning industries) and 
subcategories (such as particular fruits and vegetables in the canning indus-
try) under §§301(b)(2) and 304(b) . EPA separately established technology-
based standards to be met by publicly owned treatment works (POTWs), as 
municipal sewage treatment plants are known among water pollution con-
trol cognoscenti, §§301(b)(1)(B) and 304(d)(1) . These are performance-
based standards . They do not require permittees to install particular tech-
nologies, only to remove pollutants comparable to the removal achieved by 
the best control technologies .
38 . CWA §§301(b)(1)(B) & 304(d)(1) .
39 . Id. §308 .
40 . Id. §§309 & 505 .
41 . 33 U .S .C . §§1288 & 1329 .
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to establish programs and requirements for controlling 
nonpoint sources and provided initial funding for them to 
do so, but neither section defined nonpoint sources . Sec-
tion 208 primarily required regional planning authorities 
to ensure that federal grant funds were spent on construc-
tion of wastewater treatment plants whose locations and 
capacities were efficient and reflected expected regional 
growth . Secondarily, §208 encouraged regional planning 
authorities to develop best management plans and state 
and local enforcement mechanisms to control pollution 
from the nonpoint sources for which EPA was to develop 
best management practices under §304(f) . Section 208, 
however, lacked the structural mechanisms necessary for 
long-term effectiveness . It provided no mechanism for EPA 
to approve the adequacy of nonpoint programs developed 
by regional authorities or states . It provided no mecha-
nism for EPA or citizens to force an uncooperative state to 
develop nonpoint source programs . It provided no mecha-
nism for EPA or citizens to enforce against violations of 
a nonpoint source plan . It provided no mechanism for 
requiring EPA to develop a nonpoint source plan if a state 
does not . Finally, it did not provide for long-term funding 
for the state nonpoint source control programs . On top of 
these structural deficiencies, the regional planning organi-
zations envisioned by §208 often were not parts of the state 
water pollution control authorities that the CWA expected 
to implement the statutes’ permitting and publicly owned 
treatment works (POTWs) construction grant programs . 
Many of the state authorities viewed the regional planning 
organizations as potential rivals for power and funding and 
sought to undercut them . The combination of structural 
shortcomings and political feuding sounded the death 
knell of the program .
The 1972 statute required state water quality standards 
to be achieved by 1977 .42 Because the CWA included no 
enforceable program to control nonpoint source pollu-
tion, it is unsurprising that many segments of navigable 
waters had not achieved state-established water quality 
standards by that date or subsequently,43 despite the fact 
that most industries and municipalities achieved the first 
required levels of their technology-based standards by that 
date or shortly thereafter .44 In 1987, Congress responded 
to the failure to achieve water quality standards by adding 
§319 to the statute . The new section required states to sub-
42 . CWA §301(b)(1)(C) .
43 . According to EPA’s 2004 report to Congress on water quality:
about 44% of assessed stream miles, 64% of assessed lake acres, 
and 30% of assessed bay and estuarine square miles were not clean 
enough to support such uses as fishing and swimming . Leading 
causes for impairment included pathogens, mercury, nutrients, and 
organic enrichment/low dissolved oxygen . Top sources of impair-
ment included atmospheric deposition, agriculture, hydrologic 
modifications and unknown or unspecified sources .
 The report is available at http://water .epa .gov/lawsregs/guidance/cwa/309_
cl_22_305b_2004report-factsheet2004305b .pdf .
44 . Of the approximately 4,000 major industrial point sources, all except ap-
proximately 860 achieved their first level of pollution control by 1979, al-
though only one-half of the 4,000 major POTWs did so . See Testimony 
of Marvin Durning, U .S . EPA Assistant Administrator for Enforcement, 
Before the Subcommittee on Environmental Pollution of the Committee on 
Environment and Public Works, May 24, 1979, Serial No . 96-H16 .
mit reports identifying both segments of navigable waters 
unable to achieve water quality standards without controls 
on nonpoint sources and what types of nonpoint sources 
must be controlled to achieve water quality standards .45 It 
also required states to establish programs imposing best 
management practices on nonpoint sources to achieve 
water quality standards in those segments .46 If a state fails 
to submit the initial report, EPA must develop a report .47 
But if the state fails to submit the ultimate nonpoint source 
control program, the section provides the Agency with 
no authority to do so . The section does not provide either 
EPA or citizens with authority to force states to develop 
best management practices plans for nonpoint sources . 
While §319 goes beyond §308 in focusing on nonpoint 
sources, it too lacks the structural mechanism for long-
term effectiveness .48
Section 304(f) mentions nonpoint sources in its title, 
but not in its text . The text directed EPA to develop best 
management practices for several categories of activities: 
agricultural and silvicultural activities, including runoff 
from fields and forests; mining activities, including runoff 
from active and abandoned mines; construction activi-
ties, including runoff; deep well injection and subsurface 
disposal of wastes49; salt water intrusion50; and changes 
in water movement caused by dams, flow diversions, and 
other such structures .51 Although some of these catego-
ries of activities center on nonpoint sources, others involve 
what could be either point sources or nonpoint sources, 
and some involve only point sources . Deep well injec-
tion, subsurface waste disposal, and salt water intrusion 
all use wells, and wells are on the statutory list of point 
source examples . These activities, however, usually inject 
pollutants into groundwater, which is generally not con-
sidered to be navigable . Salt water intrusion results from 
withdrawal of freshwater in coastal areas and usually does 
not involve a discharge to surface water . Dams are usually 
45 . CWA §319(a) .
46 . Id. §319(b) .
47 . Id. §319(d) .
48 . Oliver A . Houck, The Clean Water Act TMDL Program: Law, Policy 
& Implementation (2d ed . 2000 .) For the latest round of total maximum 
daily load (TMDL) litigation, see American Farm Bureau Fed’n v. U.S. EPA, 
No . 13-4079, 2015 WL 4069224, 45 ELR 20129 (3d Cir . July 6, 2015) .
49 . Deep well injection and injection into subsurface areas are waste disposal 
methods regulated by the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 42 U .S .C . 
§§300f to 300j-26, ELR Stat . SDWA §§1401-1465, and the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U .S .C . §§6901-6992k, ELR 
Stat . RCRA §§1001-11011 . Since these methods dispose of wastes through 
a well, which is included as an example of a point source in the CWA’s defi-
nition of the term, it is odd to categorize them as nonpoint sources . Despite 
some initial uncertainty, they are not regulated by the CWA because they 
discharge to groundwater, which is not navigable water under either the 
statute or common understanding of that term . See Jeffrey G . Miller, Plain 
Meaning, Precedent, and Metaphysics: Interpreting the “Navigable Waters” Ele-
ment of the Clean Water Act Offense, 45 ELR 10548, 10573-78 (June 2015) .
50 . Excessive withdrawal of groundwater from aquifers near the seacoast allows 
salt water to replace the freshwater withdrawn, contaminating the remain-
ing freshwater aquifer .
51 . This Article examines dams, concluding they are point sources . Flow diver-
sions are not subject to §402 regulation because they add nothing to navi-
gable waters, but withdraw water from navigable waters for use elsewhere . 
When the used water is later returned to navigable water, it may be subject 
to §402 regulation .
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point sources, as are the pipes, pumps, and ditches that 
accomplish water diversions .
This subsection does not define nonpoint sources, but 
reflects Congress’ desire to have EPA focus on these par-
ticular pollution sources and develop solutions to them 
without creating serious new federal regulatory programs . 
Congress did not attempt in the subsection to draw dis-
tinctions between point and nonpoint sources . Indeed, 
the subsection overlaps to some extent with the regulatory 
programs Congress developed for point sources . The U .S . 
Supreme Court recognized in South Florida Water Man-
agement District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida 
that by addressing flow diversion facilities, §304(f) did not 
make them nonpoint sources, “if they also fall within the 
‘point source’ definition .”52 In conclusion, this subsection 
again suggests Congress did not or could not articulate a 
strict line between point sources and nonpoint sources, but 
recognized that water quality could not be protected with-
out moving beyond the regulation of point sources .
The CWA does not disregard nonpoint source dis-
charges . But while its regulation of point sources is robust, 
uniform, and effective, its regulation of nonpoint sources 
is hortatory, haphazard, and of dubious effectiveness . That 
difference in regulatory effectiveness does not mirror the 
relative importance of point and nonpoint sources to the 
quality of the nation’s water: Nonpoint sources discharge 
more pollutants than point sources . The CWA’s failure to 
deal effectively with nonpoint sources is its most significant 
failure and the primary reason we have not achieved water 
quality standards 40 years after enactment of the statute . 
EPA could ameliorate this difficulty by amending its defini-
tion of “point source” from time to time to include former 
categories of nonpoint sources for which technology-based 
treatment standards had become available .
3. Regulation of Stormwater and Storm Sewers
After the enactment of the CWA, EPA and states with 
approved §402 programs were faced with the enormous 
task of issuing permits to more than 60,000 point source 
permit applicants within a fairly short period .53 They lacked 
52 . 541 U .S . 95, 106, 34 ELR 20021 (2004) . Courts earlier had rejected argu-
ments by industry that designation of an activity for development of non-
point source best management practices in §304(f ) exempted the activity 
from regulation of a point source under §402 . United States v . Earth Sci-
ences, Inc ., 599 F .2d 368, 372, 23 ELR 21526 (10th Cir . 1979) .
53 . Congress enacted the CWA in October, 1972 . It provided in §301(a) that 
the discharge of pollutants without a permit was illegal, but granted im-
munity until the end of 1974 to permit applicants for whom permits had 
not yet been issued . See §402(k) . Thus, the statute indicates that Congress 
contemplated EPA would issue all permits by that date . EPA had not pre-
viously undertaken a task of this magnitude . The effluent guidelines that 
were to help permit writers devise effluent limitations for industrial sources 
were not yet promulgated; once they were, those guidelines were subjected 
to judicial review . Once permits were issued, many permit holders appealed 
their terms . EPA concentrated on issuing permits to applicants it classified 
as “major” point sources, that is, 15% of the applicants EPA considered to 
be discharging the vast majority of pollutants from point sources, based on 
the amounts of pollutant discharges reported in permit applications and 
on state evaluations of their adverse impact on local water quality . As of 
the end of 1975, EPA reported that of the 62,118 point sources requiring 
§402 permits, 9,259 were “major sources .” U .S . EPA, EPA Enforcement: A 
the time or resources to address stormwater and many 
minor point sources .54 At the same time, EPA was mak-
ing grants to cities and towns across the country to build 
secondary treatment plants,55 often providing sewage treat-
ment for the first time . The Agency’s construction grant 
program did not want to spend its limited resources mak-
ing grants to deal with municipal storm sewers until all cit-
ies had secondary treatment . Thus, EPA’s two largest water 
programs and their state counterparts were united in not 
wanting to address municipal storm sewers or runoff at all, 
or at least not until sometime in the indefinite future . As 
a result, EPA promulgated a regulation exempting storm-
water flows and sewers from the §402 permit program, an 
exemption soon reversed as beyond EPA’s authority, dis-
cussed in greater detail in Section III, below .
In 1987, Congress entered the fray by amending the 
CWA to add in §402(p) a program for gradually permit-
ting municipal and industrial storm sewers . The provi-
sion began with a curiously worded statement in §402(p)
(1) that “[p]rior to October 1, 1994, the Administrator  .  .  . 
shall not require a permit under this section for discharges 
composed entirely of stormwater .” Under §301(a), it is the 
CWA, not the Administrator, that requires a permit for 
a “discharge of any pollutant .” And what is a discharge 
“composed entirely of stormwater”? Does that include 
only dischargers of stormwater carrying pollutants? If 
so, §301(a) already forbids it, except for the agricultural 
stormwater flow exemption in §502(14) . If not, then the 
provision is meaningless, for a discharge without a permit 
of pollutant-free water does not violate §301(a) . The provi-
sion in §402(p)(2) exempts from the temporary exemption 
several categories of “stormwater discharges,” including 
discharges “associated with industrial activity” and from 
“municipal separate stormwater sewer systems” serving 
specified populations . Interpreted together, §402(p)(1) and 
(2) appear to require industrial stormwater dischargers 
and municipal separate sewer dischargers to apply for and 
secure permits on schedules established in §402(p)(4) and 
to exempt them from the requirement of having a permit 
in the meantime . Those subsections also appear to exempt 
other discharges of stormwater with pollutants from the 
requirement to have a permit until October 1, 1994, but 
not thereafter . The Court in Decker v. Northwest Environ-
mental Defense Center,56 however, seems to read “[p]rior 
Progress Report December 1974 to December 1975 89-90 (1976) . By the end 
of 1975, EPA and states with approved §402 permit programs had issued 
permits to all but 671 of the major sources and most of the remainder were 
either new additions to the list of major sources, or had §402 permits is-
sued by states with approved programs, but which those states deemed not 
to be final until outstanding appeals were resolved . Id. EPA permit writers 
simply did not have the resources or time to address the far more numerous 
stormwater point sources, few if any of which discharged as many pollut-
ants as major sources .
54 . Decker v . Northwest Envtl . Def . Ctr ., 133 S . Ct . 1326, 1331-21, 43 ELR 
20062 (2013) .
55 . Secondary treatment was the preferred treatment for municipal sewage . It 
constituted primary treatment by settling and secondary treatment by bio-
logical methods, usually followed by chlorination or another treatment for 
pathogens . Such facilities normally removed 85% of settleable solids and 
biological oxygen demand .
56 . 133 S . Ct . 1326, 43 ELR 20062 (2013) .
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to October 1, 1994” out of the provision, perhaps because 
EPA extended the exemption in the absence of a finding 
that the discharge must be controlled to meet water qual-
ity standards, although the decision did not mention this 
regulation .57 This issue will be discussed further below .
4. Point Source/Nonpoint Source Distinction 
Left Unclear
The statutory definition of point source, the structure of 
the statute, and the legislative history of the statute, sep-
arately or collectively, do not draw a bright line between 
point sources and nonpoint sources . EPA has not helped to 
clarify the distinction by regulation and may have muddied 
the waters further . We are left with a few hypotheses from 
the above material . Industrial and municipal waste water 
discharges are typically by point sources, while agricul-
tural discharges are typically by nonpoint sources . Storm-
water runoff is presumed to be discharged by nonpoint 
sources, but may be discharged through point sources if 
it is collected and channeled by man . Pollution from point 
sources is susceptible to end-of-pipe technology for pollu-
tion control, while pollution from nonpoint source pollu-
tion is more appropriately dealt with by land use controls 
or management practices . This is a rationale for subjecting 
point source pollution to the permit programs with nation-
ally uniform technology-based standards and nonpoint 
sources to site-specific best management practices with no 
permit program . A corollary is that as end-of-pipe technol-
ogy becomes available for particular categories of nonpoint 
sources, it would be appropriate to include those categories 
within the definition of point source to be regulated by the 
statute’s permit systems .
None of these distinctions is entirely satisfactory . Storm-
water runoff can be collected and be treated with end-of-
pipe technology . Indeed, CWA §402(p) subjects much 
municipal and industrial stormwater runoff to the §402 
point source permit program to do just that .58 Moreover, 
agricultural runoff can be point source pollution . CAFOs, 
for instance, are included in the statutory definition of 
point sources . While it may be assumed that there is a 
clear divide between point source discharges and nonpoint 
stormwater runoff, that clarity is deceiving . When storm-
water is collected and channeled by human activities, it is 
discharged from point sources and may be regulated by 
§402 permits .59 Finally, many nonpoint sources, such as 
people and animals, have nothing to do with runoff .
III. Administrative Interpretations of Point 
Source
EPA’s national pollutant discharge elimination system 
(NPDES) regulations in Title 40 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations define point source almost identically with 
57 . 40 C .F .R . §122 .6(a)(9)(i) .
58 . 33 U .S .C . §342(p) .
59 . 40 C .F .R . §122 .2 (definition of “discharge of a pollutant”) .
the CWA’s definition of the term . EPA’s definition adds 
“landfill leachate collection system” at the end of the list 
of examples of point sources . And, in the exemption, it 
reverses “return flows from irrigated agriculture” and “agri-
cultural stormwater discharges” and substitutes “runoff” 
for “discharges,” making the exception read “return flows 
from irrigated agriculture and agricultural stormwater 
runoff .” EPA probably made the last change because “point 
source” is an element of “discharge,” making the inclu-
sion of “discharge” as part of a listed exception to “point 
source” circular . Why EPA added only “landfill leachate 
collection system” to the list of point source examples is a 
mystery, for there are many other conveyances that could 
be added to the list . Moreover, discharges from leachate 
collection systems would probably be from point sources 
without the addition .60 EPA’s definition ends with “(See 
122 .3),” a phrase Congress could not have included in 
its definition of “point source .” Section 122 .3 is entitled 
“Exclusions” and excludes a number of large categories of 
discharges61 from the requirement to secure §402 permits, 
even though they otherwise would constitute additions of 
pollutants to navigable waters from point sources . This is a 
curious provision .
EPA’s definition of point source is augmented by the last 
portion of its definition of “discharge of a pollutant” in 
§122 .2, which includes “surface runoff which is collected 
or channeled by man .”62 EPA’s implementing regulations 
at 40 C .F .R . §122 .26 also require treatment of industrial 
storm sewers carrying stormwater that comes into contact 
with industrial wastes and lesser, phased requirements for 
municipal storm sewers .
Early in its implementation of the §402 permit program, 
EPA promulgated a rule exempting several categories of 
point sources from the requirement of securing permits:
60 . If a leachate collection system was discharging directly to navigable water, it 
would in all probability be through a pipe, already defined as a point source . 
If it was pumped to a tank truck for disposal elsewhere, tank trucks are held 
to be point sources .
61 . Discharges of (a) sewage from vessels; (b) dredged and fill material regulated 
under CWA §404; (c) sewage and other pollutants into POTWs by indirect 
dischargers; (d) material in compliance with instructions of On-Scene Co-
ordinators under 40 C .F .R . pt . 300; (e) pollutants from nonpoint source ag-
ricultural and silvicultural activities except as otherwise provided; (f ) return 
flows from irrigated agriculture; (g) waste from privately owned treatment 
works, and (h) material from water transfers . This list of exclusions is vastly 
oversimplified, for most of the exclusions are significantly qualified . The 
exclusion for agricultural and silvicultural activities, for example, includes
storm water runoff from orchards, cultivated crops, pastures, range 
lands, and forest lands, but not discharges from concentrated animal 
feeding operations as defined in §122 .23, discharges from concen-
trated aquatic animal production facilities as defined in §122,24, 
discharges to aquacultural projects as defined in §122 .25, and dis-
charges from silvicultural point sources as defined in §122 .27 .
62 . It also includes “discharges through pipes, sewers, or other conveyances 
owned by a State, municipality, or other person which do not lead to a 
treatment works; and discharges through pipes, sewers or other conveyances 
leading into privately owned treatment works,” but not discharges by in-
direct dischargers into POTWs . It then defines an “indirect discharger” as 
a “nondomestic discharger” introducing “pollutants” to a “publicly owned 
treatment works .” In the preamble, EPA stated its intent to incorporate the 
“broadest possible definition of point source consistent with the legislative 
intent .” 55 Fed . Reg . 47990 (Nov . 16, 1990), quoted in Washington Wil-
derness Coal . v . Hecla Mining Co ., 870 F . Supp . 983, 988, 25 ELR 20661 
(E .D . Wash . 1994) .
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human-made pollutants, finally depositing them into 
lakes, rivers, wetlands, coastal waters and ground waters .72
IV. Judicial Interpretations of Point Source
A. Preliminary Matters
It should be emphasized at the outset that the CWA does not 
authorize EPA to regulate a point source, but only to regu-
late the discharge of any pollutant, of which “point source” 
is one of several elements . The Agency made the mistake of 
promulgating regulations requiring CAFO point sources 
to apply for CWA §402 permits regardless of whether the 
CAFOs discharged pollutants . In National Pork Producers 
Council v. U.S. EPA, the U .S . Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit struck this regulation as beyond the Agency’s 
authority .73 Moreover, not all point sources require §402 
permits, even if they add pollutants to navigable water . For 
example, industries that discharge pollutants to POTWs 
for treatment before discharge to navigable waters are held 
to be point sources,74 but EPA’s regulations define them 
as “indirect sources” and have exempted them from the 
§402 permit program, subject instead to regulation under 
the CWA §307(b) pretreatment program .75 Courts are also 
in broad agreement that EPA has substantial authority to 
define point sources .76 Perhaps, there is not as much need 
for a broad interpretation for point sources as for the other 
elements of the offense, however, because if the other ele-
72 . See EPA’s web page, http://water .epa .gov/polwaste/nps/index .cfm . Also 
useful are several EPA guidance documents quoted or cited in Cordiano v. 
Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 575 F .3d 199, 220-21 (2d Cir . 2009) .
73 . 635 F .3d 738, 749-53, 41 ELR 20115 (5th Cir . 2011) . See also Service Oil 
Inc . v . EPA, 590 F .3d 545, 550, 40 ELR 20002 (8th Cir . 2009); Water-
keeper Alliance v . U .S . EPA, 399 F .3d 486, 504, 35 ELR 20049 (2d Cir . 
2005) .
74 . RSR Corp . v . Browner, 924 F . Supp . 504, 511, 26 ELR 21353 (S .D .N .Y . 
1996), aff’d, No . 96-6186, 1997 WL 134413 (2d Cir . Mar . 26, 1997); af-
firmance vacated without explanation, No . 96-6186 (2d Cir . Apr . 17, 1997) 
(defendant subject to EPA’s information demand authority over point 
sources under CWA §308, 33 U .S .C . §1318, even though it was an indi-
rect discharger to a POTW) . See also U .S . EPA v . Green Forest, Ark ., 921 
F .2d 1394, 1398, 21 ELR 20610 (8th Cir . 1990); United States v . Velsicol 
Chem . Corp ., 438 F . Supp . 945, 946-47 (W .D . Tenn . 1976) .
75 . Assuming, that is, the discharge is into a municipal system providing treat-
ment rather than into a storm sewer . Title 40 C .F .R . §122 .2 defines “dis-
charge of a pollutant” to exclude addition of pollutants by an “indirect 
discharger,” which it in turn defines as a nondomestic discharger introduc-
ing pollutants to a “publicly owned treatment works .” See also 40 C .F .R . 
§122 .3(c), which excludes indirect dischargers from the requirement to se-
cure a §402 permit . The reason EPA excludes indirect dischargers from the 
permit program is that CWA §307(b) requires indirect dischargers to pre-
treat their wastes before discharging them to POTWs to prevent them from 
interfering with the POTWs or to allow the indirect sources’ wastes to pass 
through the POTW untreated . The section also requires indirect sources 
to treat their wastes meeting technology-based standards to remove toxic 
pollutants . Finally, CWA §402(b)(8) and (9) contemplate that POTWs will 
regulate indirect discharges by permits or other means to require compli-
ance with both the interference and pass-through prohibitions and the toxic 
pollutant pretreatment standards . See also EPA’s pretreatment program regu-
lations at 40 C .F .R . pt . 403 .
76 . This was first recognized by Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F .2d 
1369, 1377, 8 ELR 20028 (D .C . Cir . 1978), which held that EPA could 
not exempt point sources adding pollutants to navigable water from the 
§402 permit program, but had broad discretion to define point source . See 
also United States v . Earth Sciences, Inc ., 599 F .2d 368, 372, 23 ELR 21526 
(10th Cir . 1979) .
all silvicultural point sources; all confined animal 
feeding operations below a certain size; all irrigation 
return flows areas less than 3,000 contiguous acres or 
3,000 noncontiguous acres that use the same drainage 
system; all nonfeedlot, nonirrigated agricultural point 
sources; and separate storm sewers containing only 
storm water uncontaminated by any industrial or com-
mercial activity .63
Environmentalists challenged EPA’s regulation as 
beyond the Agency’s statutory authority . The U .S . Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia (D .C .) Circuit 
agreed, holding in Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc. v. Costle that EPA had no authority to exempt point 
sources discharging pollutants to navigable waters from 
the permit program .64 The court did suggest, however, 
that the Agency had authority to define point sources, 
and subsequent courts have agreed .65 EPA followed the 
court’s suggestion by promulgating rules defining storm-
water flow point sources,66 CAFO point sources,67 silvi-
culture point sources,68 and aquacultural point sources .69 
The new definition did not include many of the dis-
charges exempted by the overturned rule and therefore 
remain excluded from the §402 program . Courts have 
held, however, that the rules are valid exercises of EPA’s 
definitional authority rather than invalid attempts to 
exempt point source discharges from the permit pro-
gram .70 Thus, Costle was a pyrrhic victory for the envi-
ronmental plaintiffs .
EPA made no attempt in its permit program regulations 
to define nonpoint source . The Agency has made some 
attempt to do so elsewhere, however . In its web page on 
nonpoint source, EPA states that “nonpoint source pol-
lution generally results from land runoff, precipitation, 
drainage, seepage or hydrologic modification . The term 
‘nonpoint source’ is defined to mean any source of water 
pollution that does not meet the legal definition of ‘point 
source’ in section 502(14) of the Clean Water Act .”71 The 
Agency continues:
Nonpoint source (NPS) pollution, unlike pollution from 
industrial and sewage treatment plants, comes from many 
diffuse sources . NPS pollution is caused by rainfall or 
snowmelt moving over and through the ground . As the 
runoff moves, it picks up and carries away natural and 
63 . Natural Res . Def . Council, Inc . v . Costle, 568 F .2d 1369, 1372-73, 8 ELR 
20028 (D .C . Cir . 1977) . The regulation is found at 40 C .F .R . §125 .4 
(1975) .
64 . 568 F .2d 1369, 8 ELR 20028 (D .C . Cir . 1977) .
65 . Id. at 1372 . Subsequent courts agreeing include United States v. Earth Sci-
ences, Inc., 599 F .2d 368, 372, 23 ELR 21526 (10th Cir . 1979); Wild Fish 
Conservancy v. Quilcene Nat’l Fish Hatchery, 2009 WL 3380655 (W .D . 
Wash . 2009); and U.S. Public Interest Research Grp. v. Atlantic Salmon of 
Maine, Inc., LLC, 215 F . Supp . 2d 239, 249, 32 ELR 20535 (D . Me . 2002) .
66 . 40 C .F .R . §122 .26(b)(14) .
67 . Id. §122 .23(c) .
68 . Id. §122 .27 .
69 . Id. §122 .24 &  .25 .
70 . Earth Sciences, Inc ., 599 F .2d 368; Wild Fish Conservancy, 2009 WL 
3380655 .
71 . See EPA’s web page, http://water .epa .gov/polwaste/nps/whatis .cfm .
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ments are not met, then the discharge escapes CWA juris-
diction altogether, but if the point source element is not 
met, then the discharge may still be under CWA jurisdic-
tion as a nonpoint source .
Finally, a number of courts have held that conveyances 
are point sources only if they are the origins of the pollut-
ants, that is, they convey the pollutants from their point 
of origin . This idea was first espoused by EPA in National 
Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, where the Agency argued 
that there is an addition of a pollutant from a point source 
“only if the point source itself physically introduces a pol-
lutant into water from the outside world .”77 The D .C . 
Circuit gave deference to EPA’s interpretation . Although 
the interpretation in that case concerned the meaning of 
“addition,” it could just as well have been an interpretation 
of “point source” as the first conveyance to introduce the 
pollutant into water or at least into navigable water . The 
Supreme Court decisively rejected this notion in Miccosu-
kee Tribe, in which it held that “a point source need not be 
the original source of the pollutant: it need only convey 
the pollutant to navigable water .”78 Since Miccosukee Tribe, 
courts have rejected the notion, as many did earlier .
B. Held to Be Point Sources
Courts have held the following to be point sources: air-
planes dropping bombs or spraying pesticides79; aquacul-
tural facilities80; barges81; breaks in berms82; bulldozers, 
cranes, dump trucks, loaders, plows, tractors, and other 
construction and earth-moving equipment83; canals, 
77 . 693 F .2d 156, 175, 13 ELR 20015 (D .C . Cir . 1982), North Carolina Shell-
fish Growers Ass’n v . Holly Ridge Assocs ., LLC, 278 F . Supp . 2d 654, 680 
(E .D .N .C . 2003) (although CWA violations cannot result from purely pas-
sive developments on a defendant’s property, the active moving of land is 
sufficient to trigger liability under the Act) . Contra Sierra Club v . El Paso 
Gold Mines, Inc ., 421 F .3d 1133, 1145, 35 ELR 20175 (10th Cir . 2005) 
(“This is a case where if you own the leaky ‘faucet,’ you are responsible for 
its ‘drips .’”); Dague v . City of Burlington, 935 F .2d 1343, 1354-55, 21 ELR 
21133 (2d Cir . 1991) .
78 . South Fla . Water Mgmt . Dist . v . Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla ., 541 
U .S . 95, 105, 34 ELR 20021 (2004) .
79 . Romero-Barcelo v . Brown, 478 F . Supp . 646, 664 (D .P .R . 1979), rev’d on 
other grounds sub nom. Weinberger v . Romero-Barcelo, 643 F .2d 835, 11 
ELR 20391 (1st Cir . 1981), rev’d on other grounds, 456 U .S . 305, 12 ELR 
20538 (1982); Peconic Baykeeper, Inc . v . Suffolk Cnty ., 600 F .3d 180, 188-
89, 40 ELR 20098 (2d Cir . 2010); League of Wilderness Defenders v . Fors-
gren, 309 F .3d 1181, 1183-85 (9th Cir . 2002) .
80 . U .S . Public Interest Research Grp . v . Atlantic Salmon of Maine, LLC, 215 
F . Supp . 2d 239, 32 ELR 20535 (D . Me . 2002) .
81 . United States v . West Indies Transportation, Inc ., 127 F .3d 299, 308-09, 28 
ELR 20202 (3d Cir . 1997) .
82 . Reynolds v . Rick’s Mushroom Serv ., Inc ., 246 F . Supp . 2d 449 (E .D . Pa . 
2003); O’Leary v . Moyer’s Landfill, Inc ., 523 F . Supp . 642, 655, 12 ELR 
20239 (E .D . Pa . 1981); United States v . Oxford Royal Mushroom Prods ., 
Inc ., 487 F . Supp . 852, 954, 10 ELR 20549 (E .D . Pa . 1980) .
83 . Parker v . Scrap Metal Processors, Inc ., 386 F .3d 993, 1009, 34 ELR 20104 
(11th Cir . 2004); Borden Ranch P’ship v . U .S . Army Corps of Eng’rs, 261 
F .3d 810, 814, 32 ELR 20011 (9th Cir . 2001), aff’d, 537 U .S . 99 (2002); 
United States v . Pozsgai, 999 F .2d 719, 726 n .6, 23 ELR 21012 (3d Cir . 
1993); Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc . v . Marsh, 715 F .2d 897, 922, 13 
ELR 20942 (5th Cir . 1983); United States v . Lambert, 915 F . Supp . 797, 26 
ELR 21116 (S .D . W . Va . 1996); United States v . Sinclair Oil, 767 F . Supp . 
200, 21 ELR 21323 (D . Mont . 1990); United States v . Weisman, 489 F . 
Supp . 1331, 1336-37, 10 ELR 20698 (M .D . Fla . 1980); United States v . 
Holland, 373 F . Supp . 665, 668, 4 ELR 20710 (M .D . Fla . 1074).
pumps, and levees84; collection pond and tank cracks, leaks, 
bypasses, and overflows85; CAFOs86; construction sites87; 
dams88; ditches89; entire facilities or industrial plants90; 
facilities discharging to POTWs91; fields overflowing with 
applied manure92; human beings93; manure spreaders94; 
mine adits, shafts, pits, and tunnels95; mushroom-grow-
ing facilities96; overflowing collection and tailings ponds 
and lagoons97; piles of debris, material, and waste rock98; 
84 . South Fla . Water Mgmt . Dist ., v . Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla ., 541 
U .S . 95, 34 ELR 20021 (2004); Friends of the Everglades v . South Fla . 
Water Mgmt . Dist ., 570 F .3d 1210, 39 ELR 20118 (11th Cir . 2009) .
85 . Moyer’s Landfill 523 F . Supp . at 655 .
86 . National Pork Producers’ Council v . U .S . EPA, 635 F .3d 738, 41 ELR 
20115 (5th Cir . 2010); Concerned Area Residents for Env’t v . Southview 
Farm, 34 F .3d 114, 123, 24 ELR 21480 (3d Cir . 1994); Community Ass’n 
for Restoration of Env’t v . Henry Bosma Dairy, Inc ., 305 F .3d 943, 955 
(9th Cir . 2002); Carr v . Alta Verde Industries, Inc ., 931 F .2d 1055, 21 ELR 
21005 (5th Cir . 1991); Assateague Coastkeeper v . Hudson Farm, 727 F . 
Supp . 2d 433, 439-40, 40 ELR 20208 (D . Md . 2010) .
87 . North Carolina Shellfish Growers Ass’n v . Holly Ridge Assocs ., 278 F . Supp . 
2d 654, 679 (E .D .N .C . 2003); Molokai Chamber of Commerce v . Kukui, 
891 F . Supp . 1389, 1401, 26 ELR 20303 (D . Haw . 1995) .
88 . S .D . Warren Co . v . Maine Bd . of Envtl . Prot ., 547 U .S . 370, 36 ELR 20089 
(2006); Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v . U .S . Forest Serv ., 550 F .3d 778, 787 
n .4, 39 ELR 20297 (9th Cir . 2008); Greenfield Mills, Inc . v . Macklin, 361 
F .3d 934, 34 ELR 20022 (7th Cir . 2004); Committee to Save Mokelumne 
River v . East Bay Mun . Util . Dist ., 13 F .3d 305, 24 ELR 20225 (9th Cir . 
1993); National Wildlife Fed’n v . Gorsuch, 693 F .2d 156, 165, 13 ELR 
20015 (D .C . Cir . 1982); North Carolina Shellfish Growers, 278 F . Supp . 2d 
at 679; South Carolina Wildlife Fed’n v . Alexander, 457 F . Supp . 118, 126, 
8 ELR 20757 (D .S .C . 1978); Del-Aware Unlimited v . Commissioner, Dep’t 
of Envtl . Res ., 96 Pa . Cmwlth . 361, 381-82 (Pa . 1986) .
89 . Henry Bosma Diary, 305 F .3d at 955; National Ass’n of Home Builders v . 
U .S . Army Corps of Eng’rs, 699 F . Supp . 2d 209, 215-16, 40 ELR 20104 
(D .D .C . 2010), vacated on other grounds, 663 F .3d 470 (D .C . Cir . 2011); 
North Carolina Shellfish Growers, 278 F . Supp . 2d at 679; Environmental 
Prot . Info . Ctr . v . Pacific Lumber Co ., 469 F . Supp . 2d 803, 821, 37 ELR 
20012 (N .D . Cal . 2007) .
90 . United States v . Earth Sciences, Inc ., 599 F .2d 368, 23 ELR 21526 (10th 
Cir . 1979); North Carolina Shellfish Growers, 278 F . Supp . 2d 654; Reynolds 
v . Rick’s Mushroom Serv ., Inc ., 246 F . Supp . 2d 449 (E .D . Pa . 2003); Wil-
liams Pipeline Co . v . Bayer Corp ., 964 F . Supp . 1300, 1318-20 (S .D . Iowa 
1997) .
91 . RSR Corp . v . Browner, 924 F . Supp . 504, 511, 26 ELR 21353 (S .D .N .Y . 
1996) .
92 . Concerned Area Residents for Env’t v . Southview Farm, 34 F .3d 114, 118-
19, 24 ELR 21480 (3d Cir . 1994) (3d Cir . 2004); Henry Bosma Dairy, 305 
F .3d at 955; Rick’s Mushroom Serv ., 246 F . Supp . 2d at 456-57; United States 
v . Oxford Royal Mushroom Prods ., Inc ., 487 F . Supp . 852, 854, 10 ELR 
20549 (E .D . Pa . 1980) .
93 . United States v . Villegas, 784 F . Supp . 6, 8-11, 22 ELR 21027 (E .D .N .Y . 
1991), rev’d sub nom. United States v . Plaza Health Labs ., Inc ., 3 F .3d 643, 
23 ELR 21526 (2d Cir . 1991) .
94 . League of Wilderness Defenders v . Forsgren, 309 F .3d at 1184; Concerned 
Area Residents, 34 F .3d 114 at 24; Henry Bosma Dairy, 305 F .3d at 955 .
95 . Sierra Club v . El Paso Gold Mines, Inc ., 421 F .3d 1133, 1441, 35 ELR 
20175 (10th Cir . 2005); West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v . Huffman, 
588 F . Supp . 2d 678, 39 ELR 20201 (S .D . W . Va . 2009), aff’d, 625 F .3d 159 
(4th Cir . 2010); Beartooth Alliance v . Crown Butte Mines, 904 F . Supp . 
1168, 1173-74, 26 ELR 20639 (D . Mont . 1995) .
96 . Reynolds v . Rick’s Mushroom Serv ., Inc ., 246 F . Supp . 2d 449 (E .D . Pa . 
2003); Oxford Royal Mushroom Prods ., Inc ., 487 F . Supp . 852, 10 ELR 
20549 (E .D . Pa . 1980) .
97 . Washington Wilderness Coal . v . Hecla Mining Co ., 870 F . Supp . 983, 988, 
25 ELR 20661 (E .D . Wash . 1994); Fishel v . Westinghouse Elec . Corp ., 640 
F . Supp . 442, 446, 16 ELR 20634 (M .D . Pa . 1986); O’Leary v . Moyer’s 
Landfill, Inc ., 523 F . Supp . 642, 655, 12 ELR 20239 (E .D . Pa . 1981) .
98 . Parker v . Scrap Metals Processors, Inc ., 386 F .3d 993, 1009, 34 ELR 20104 
(11th Cir . 2004); Bravos v . EPA, 324 F .3d 1166 (10th Cir . 2003); Trustees 
for Alaska v . EPA, 749 F .2d 549, 558, 15 ELR 20146 (9th Cir . 1984); Sierra 
Club v . Abston Constr . Co ., Inc ., 620 F .2d 41, 45, 10 ELR 20552 (5th Cir . 
1980); United States v . Earth Sciences, Inc ., 599 F .2d 368, 9 ELR 20542 
(10th Cir . 1979); Washington Wilderness Coal ., 870 F . Supp . at 988 .
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pipes and hoses99; railway culverts100; rifle ranges101; sep-
tic systems102; sluice boxes103; spray apparatuses attached 
to trucks and helicopters104; sump overflows105; systems for 
circulating, channeling, or draining stormwater runoff106; 
toilets connected to storm sewers107; tank trucks108; trucks 
with attached spreaders or sprayers109; and turbines .110
C. Held Not to Be Point Sources
Courts have held the following not to be point sources: 
agricultural runoff from farms and CAFO fields111; aqua-
cultural facilities112; buildings storing trash113; cattle114; 
dams115; human beings116; piles of coal and rock117; rifle 
99 . United States v . Lippold, 2007 WL 3232483 at **2-3 (C .D . Ill . 
2007) (uncontested) .
100 . Dague v . City of Burlington, 935 F .2d 1343, 1355, 21 ELR 21133 (2d Cir . 
1991) .
101 . Stone v . Naperville Park Dist ., 38 F . Supp . 2d 651, 655 (N .D . Ill . 1999); 
Long Island Soundkeeper Fund, Inc . v . New York Athletic Club, 1996 WL 
131863 (S .D .N .Y . 1996) .
102 . United States v . Agosto-Vega, 617 F .3d 541, 40 ELR 20222 (1st Cir . 2010); 
United States v . Lucas, 516 F .3d 316, 332, 38 ELR 20041 (5th Cir . 2008); 
Friends of the Sakonnet v . Dutra, 738 F . Supp . 623, 629-30, 21 ELR 20055 
(D .R .I . 1990) .
103 . Trustees, 749 F .2d at 558 .
104 . Peconic Baykeeper, Inc . v . Suffolk Cnty ., 600 F .3d 180, 188-89, 40 ELR 
20098 (2d Cir . 2010); National Cotton Council of Am . v . U .S . EPA, 553 
F .3d 927, 39 ELR 20006 (6th Cir . 2009); League of Wilderness Defenders/
Blue Mountain Biodiversity Project v . Forsgren, 309 F .3d 1181 (9th Cir . 
2002) .
105 . United States v . Earth Sciences, 599 F .2d 368, 374, 23 ELR 21526 (10th 
Cir . 1979); Washington Wilderness Coal . v . Hecla Mining Co ., 870 F . 
Supp . 983, 987-89, 25 ELR 20661 (E .D . Wash . 1994) .
106 . Northwest Envtl . Def . Ctr . v . Brown, 640 F .3d 1063, 1069-73, 41 ELR 
20178 (9th Cir . 2011); Greater Yellowstone Coal . v . Lewis, 638 F .3d 1143, 
41 ELR 20059 (9th Cir . 2010); Carr v . Alta Verde Indust ., Inc ., 931 F .2d 
1055, 21 ELR 21005 (5th Cir . 1991); Sierra Club v . Abston Constr . Co ., 
Inc ., 620 F .2d 41, 10 ELR 20552 (5th Cir . 1980); Sierra Club v . El Paso 
Gold Mines, Inc ., 421 F .3d 1133, 35 ELR 20175 (10th Cir . 2005); Envi-
ronmental Prot . Info . Ctr . v . Pacific Lumber Co ., 469 F . Supp . 2d 803, 37 
ELR 20012 (N .D . Cal . 2007); North Carolina Shellfish Growers Ass’n v . 
Holly Ridge Assocs ., 278 F . Supp . 2d 654 (E .D .N .C . 2003) .
107 . United States v . Ortiz, 427 F .3d 1278, 35 ELR 20220 (10th Cir . 2005) .
108 . United States v . Agosto-Vega, 617 F .3d 541, 40 ELR 20222 (1st Cir . 2010) 
(uncontested); Concerned Area Residents for Env’t v . Southview Farm, 34 
F .3d 114, 24 ELR 21480 (3d Cir . 1994); United States v . Lippold, 2007 
WL 3232483 at **2-3 (C .D . Ill . 2007) (uncontested) .
109 . League of Wilderness Defenders v . Forsgren, 309 F .3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir . 
2002) .
110 . S .D . Warren Co . v . Maine Bd . of Envtl . Prot ., 547 U .S . 370, 36 ELR 20089 
(2006); South Carolina Wildlife Fed’n v . Alexander, 457 F . Supp . 118, 126-
27, 8 ELR 20757 (D .S .C . 1978) .
111 . National Pork Producers’ Council v . U .S . EPA, 635 F .3d 738, 41 ELR 
20115 (5th Cir . 2011) .
112 . Association to Protect Hammersly, Eld, & Totten Inlets v . Taylor Res ., Inc ., 
299 F .3d 1007, 1018-19 (9th Cir . 2002); Wild Fish Conservancy v . Quil-
cene Natural Fish Hatchery, 2009 WL 3380655 (W .D . Wash . 2009) .
113 . Hudson Riverkeeper Fund, Inc . v . Harbor at Hastings Assocs ., 917 F . Supp . 
251, 257, 26 ELR 21120 (S .D .N .Y . 1996) .
114 . Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v . U .S . Forest Serv ., 550 F .3d 788, 39 ELR 
20297 (9th Cir . 2008) .
115 . Froebel v . Meyer, 217 F .3d 928, 30 ELR 20746 (7th Cir . 2000); National 
Wildlife Fed’n v . Gorsuch, 693 F .2d 156, 13 ELR 20015 (D .C . Cir . 1982) 
(dams may be point sources, but they do not add pollutants to down-
stream flows) .
116 . United States v . Plaza Health Labs ., Inc ., 3 F .3d 643, 646, 23 ELR 21526 
(2d Cir . 1993) .
117 . Appalachian Power Co . v . Train, 545 F .2d 1351, 6 ELR 20732 (4th Cir . 
1976) .
ranges118; seeps from a swamp into groundwater119; silvicul-
tural runoff120; toll booth stations on bridges121; and waste 
pits with covers to minimize precipitation intrusion .122
D. Easy Decisions, Difficult Decisions
The definition of “point source” as a “discernible, confined 
and discrete conveyance” is a straightforward concept that 
is easy to apply in most factual situations . Its list of exam-
ples is long and inclusive, creating a large set of per se point 
sources . That set of point sources and conveyances analo-
gous to them cover most obvious conveyances of pollutants 
to navigable waters . Not surprisingly, more than one-half 
of the courts interpreting point source reached their deci-
sions easily, based on two or fewer interpretive devices or 
two or fewer precedents .123 Few decisions conduct an in-
depth interpretation of point source because “any identi-
fiable conveyance” will suffice .124 That is not the end of 
the inquiry, however, since even clear point sources may 
be subject to a statutory or regulatory exemption, such as 
the exemption for “agricultural stormwater discharges .”125 
The difficult cases are signaled when judicial decisions hold 
similar discharges to be both point sources and nonpoint 
sources, and when decisions use five or more interpretive 
devices or cite five or more precedents to decide .126
The difficult decisions fall into two general categories . 
One category involves whether human activity sufficiently 
collects and channels pollutants in stormwater runoff for 
the conveyance to be considered a point source; for exam-
ple, runoff from rock and coal piles .127 The statutory his-
tory describes nonpoint sources solely in terms of runoff . 
Therefore, under the legislative history, all conveyances of 
pollutants would be point sources in the absence of storm-
water runoff . But while a large number of decisions fall 
into this first category, examining whether a conveyance 
of runoff is a point source, most decisions fall into the sec-
ond category, examining whether a conveyance is a point 
source in cases where there is no runoff . In the latter cases, 
118 . Cordiano v . Metacon Gun Club, Inc ., 575 F .3d 199 (2d Cir . 2009) (insuf-
ficient proof to support allegations) .
119 . Williams Pipeline Co ., v . Bayer Corp ., 964 F . Supp . 1300, 1326 (S .D . Iowa 
1997) .
120 . Decker v . Northwest Envtl . Def . Ctr ., 133 U .S . 1326, 43 ELR 20062 
(2013) .
121 . U .S . EPA ex rel . McKeown v . Port Auth . of N .Y . & N .J ., 162 F . Supp . 2d 
173, 188-89 (S .D .N .Y . 2001), aff’d sub nom . McKeown v . Delaware Bridge 
Auth ., 23 F . App’x 81 (2d Cir . 2001) .
122 . Greater Yellowstone Coal . v . Lewis, 638 F .3d 1143, 1153, 41 ELR 
20059 (9th Cir . 2010) (some discharges were point sources and others 
nonpoint sources) .
123 . See infra tbl . B .
124 . Peconic Baykeeper, Inc . v . Suffolk Cnty ., 600 F .3d 180, 188, 40 ELR 20098 
(2d Cir . 2010) (citing Cordiano v . Metacon Gun Club, Inc ., 575 F .3d 199, 
219 (2d Cir . 2009)) . Only about 10% of the decisions interpreting point 
source use five or more canons of statutory construction and only about 
20% use five or more precedents . See infra tbl . B .
125 . CWA §502(14) .
126 . See infra tbl . B .
127 . See, e.g ., Sierra Club v . Abston Constr . Co ., Inc ., 620 F .2d 41, 44-47, 10 
ELR 20552 (5th Cir . 1980) (may be point sources) . But see Appalachian 
Power v . Train, 545 F .2d 1351, 1372-74, 6 ELR 20732 (4th Cir . 1976) 
(may not be point sources) .
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statutory history gives us no guidance beyond its general 
admonition to interpret the statute broadly .
Most of the earliest opinions at both the federal district 
court and circuit courts of appeal levels interpreting point 
source were decided using a plain meaning analysis . As 
soon as there were reported decisions on the issue, how-
ever, precedent became the most commonly used interpre-
tive device . The third most commonly used interpretive 
device was to interpret statutes broadly to effectuate the 
statutory purpose . In all, 16 canons were used interpret-
ing point source .128 More than one-half of the decisions 
used only one or two interpretive devices, usually prece-
dent and plain meaning or sometimes broad interpretation . 
These were easy decisions . The U .S . Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit decision in United States v. Earth Sci-
ences, Inc. claimed a particularly broad reach for the term 
to embrace “the broadest possible definition of any identi-
fiable conveyance from which pollutants might enter the 
waters of the United States,”129 which many decisions since 
have quoted .130 And another court noted that EPA, in its 
promulgation of the regulations for stormwater flow, “has 
stated its intent ‘to embrace the broadest possible definition 
of point source consistent with the legislative intent of the 
CWA .’”131 Of course, there are bounds to broad interpreta-
tion, especially when Congress itself has articulated them, 
as it did in the CWA by providing for nonpoint sources .132
The Article will analyze in turn the first category of dif-
ficult decisions, those involving precipitation runoff; the 
second category of point source decisions, those having 
nothing to do with runoff; and then suggest regulatory 
definitions of point source and nonpoint source .
E. Stormwater Runoff Decisions
1. Runoff
Stormwater runoff is better described as precipitation run-
off because it consists of the natural flow of both rain after 
it hits the ground and the flow of snow, sleet, or ice after 
they melt on the ground . Senator Muskie in his above-
quoted statement said that agricultural runoff “is a non-
point source .” Courts have also called runoff “nonpoint 
pollution .”133 Both statements are inaccurate in terms of 
statutory language and can confuse the interpretive anal-
128 . See infra tbl . B .
129 . 599 F .2d 368, 373, 23 ELR 21526 (10th Cir . 1979) .
130 . Cordiano v . Metacon Gun Club, Inc ., 575 F .3d 199, 219 (2d Cir . 2009); 
Dague v . City of Burlington, 935 F .2d 1343, 1354, 21 ELR 21133 (2d Cir . 
1991); United States v . West Indies Transp ., Inc ., 127 F .3d 299, 309, 28 
ELR 20202 (3d Cir . 997) .
131 . Beartooth Alliance v . Crown Butte Mines, 904 F . Supp . 1168, 1173, 26 
ELR 20639 (D . Mont . 1995) (quoting 55 Fed . Reg . 47990, 47997 (Nov . 
16, 1990)) . See also Washington Wilderness Coal . v . Hecla Mining Co ., 870 
F . Supp . 983, 988, 25 ELR 20661 (E .D . Wash . 1994) .
132 . The definition of point source “cannot be interpreted so broadly as to read 
the point source requirement out of the statute,” Metacon Gun Club, 575 
F .3d at 219 . For a discussion of how Congress realized that some of the goals 
in the CWA were unattainable and unrealistic, see National Wildlife Fed’n v. 
Gorsuch, 693 F .2d 156, 179-82, 13 ELR 20015 (D .C . Cir . 1982) .
133 . Northwest Envtl . Def . Ctr . v . Brown, 640 F .3d 1063, 1076, 41 ELR 20178 
(9th Cir . 2011); Gorsuch, 693 F .2d at 177 .
ysis . For runoff to be a “nonpoint source,” stormwater 
would have to be a non-conveyance or an indiscernible, 
unconfined, and indiscrete conveyance . For runoff to be “a 
nonpoint pollutant,” stormwater would have to be a “pol-
lutant .” The statutory definitions of point source and pol-
lutant, however, do not include stormwater itself; rather, it 
is something that may be conveyed by a point source and 
a medium in which a pollutant may be suspended and car-
ried . Some courts have told us that roads are the prototypi-
cal nonpoint sources:
The most common example of nonpoint source pollu-
tion is the residue left on roadways by automobiles . Small 
amounts of rubber are worn off of the tires of millions 
of cars and deposited as a thin film on highways: min-
ute particles of copper dust from brake linings are spread 
across roads and parking lots each time a driver applies the 
brakes; drips and drabs of oil and gas ubiquitously stain 
driveways and streets . When it rains, the rubber particles 
and copper dust and gas and oil wash off of the street and 
are carried along by runoff in a polluted soup, winding up 
in creeks, rivers, bays, and the ocean .134
Notice the U .S . Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
is discussing nonpoint source pollution . The precipitation 
here is natural . The road is not natural, nor are the pollut-
ants . Is the road a conveyance? Vehicles traveling the road 
are conveyances of passengers and goods . Does the road in 
turn convey the vehicles? Not in the ordinary meaning of 
convey or conveyance . Does the road convey the precipi-
tation or the pollutants? Most roads are crowned so that 
precipitation runs off to the side . Roads are defined, con-
fined, and discrete as they run from one place to another, 
but are they defined, confined, and discrete as they convey 
stormwater runoff to their sides? Again, not in the ordi-
nary meaning of convey or conveyance . Under this analy-
sis, runoff from roads is not conveyed by the roads and the 
roads are nonpoint sources .
But that is not the end of the analysis . Once runoff has 
flowed off the roads, it often flows into roadside ditches, 
designed to carry stormwater runoff to the nearest surface 
water, often discharged from the ditches or culverts, both of 
which are point sources .135 In the absence of ditches, roads 
might flood and some of the runoff would flow to surface 
waters, while some of it would percolate into the ground 
and some of it would evaporate . Courts and EPA are fond of 
citing roads as typical nonpoint sources,136 but their analy-
ses are not complete . Their reasoning would keep roads 
134 . League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v . 
Forsgren, 309 F .3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir . 2002); see also United States v . 
Earth Sciences, Inc ., 599 F .2d 368, 371, 23 ELR 21526 (10th Cir . 1979); 
U .S . EPA ex rel . McKeown v . Port Auth . of N .Y . & N .J ., 162 F . Supp . 2d 
173, 189 (S .D .N .Y . 2001) .
135 . “Ditches” are included in the list of examples of “point sources” in CWA 
§502(14) . Culverts have been held to be point sources, Dague, 935 F .2d 
1354, not surprisingly since culverts are pipes that are the first example 
of point sources listed in the statutory definition of point source, CWA 
§502(14) .
136 . Earth Sciences, 599 F .2d at 371; Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J ., 162 F . Supp . 2d at 
189; Hecla, 870 F . Supp . at 988 (E .D . Wash . 1994) . See also EPA’s web page 
at http://water .epa .gov/polwaste/nps/roadshwys .
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out of the CWA §402 program, but not roadside drainage 
ditches and culverts . After all, municipal storm sewers carry 
stormwater runoff from street gutters to navigable waters 
and municipal storm sewers are point sources that require 
permits under §402(p) . EPA has exempted such flows from 
the requirement to secure §402 permits, however, as long as 
they are composed “entirely of stormwater .”137
Most courts interpret point source in terms of the 
general distinctions between point sources and nonpoint 
sources found in the legislative history and hinted at by 
the statute itself . At a very general level, this is the dis-
tinction between stormwater runoff that is not collected 
or channeled by human activity, considered to be from 
a nonpoint source138; and stormwater runoff that is col-
lected or channeled by human activity, considered to be 
from a point source .139 While this is a useful distinction, 
it is sometimes not dispositive because courts may believe 
that conveyances of stormwater flow created or channeled 
by minor human activity or by human activity not aimed 
at controlling water is insufficient to constitute a point 
source .140 Moreover, many point source decisions do not 
involve stormwater flow at all, even decisions holding that 
there is no point source .
2. Getting Beyond Semantics: Dropping the 
Point Source/Nonpoint Source Distinction
The problem with interpreting point source by distinguish-
ing between point sources and nonpoint sources is that 
Congress did not define nonpoint sources . They could be 
indiscernible, unconfined, and indiscrete conveyances or 
they might not be conveyances at all . When the legisla-
tive history and court decisions speak of nonpoint source 
pollution or a nonpoint source pollutant, they are refer-
ring to pollution and pollutants, not to conveyances . The 
easiest way to resolve this semantic and conceptual prob-
lem is simply to eliminate the concept of nonpoint sources 
from the interpretation of point source . We can still use 
the factors that courts consider to determine whether a 
conveyance is a point source . The benefits to nonpoint 
sources of evading regulation under §402 will not be lost 
to them, because if there is no point source, there is no 
regulation under §402 . Moreover, Congress has provided 
that some discharges from point sources are not regulated 
under §402, and EPA has promulgated regulations provid-
ing that other discharges from point sources are exempted 
from the requirement of securing a §402 permit .141 EPA 
137 . 40 C .F .R . §122 .26(a)(9)(i) .
138 . Northwest Envtl . Def. Ctr., 640 F .3d at 1070-71; Greater Yellowstone 
Coal . v . Lewis, 628 F .3d 1143, 1153, 41 ELR 20059 (9th Cir . 2010) (seep 
through cover over mining pit) .
139 . Northwest Envtl. Def. Ctr ., 640 F .3d at 1070-71; Greater Yellowstone, 628 
F .3d at 1152 (mine drainage system); Sierra Club v . El Paso Gold Mines, 
Inc ., 421 F .3d 1133, 1142-44, 35 ELR 20175 (10th Cir . 2005); Sierra Club 
v . Abston Constr . Co ., 620 F .2d 41, 45, 10 ELR 20552 (5th Cir . 1980) .
140 . Appalachian Power Co . v . Train, 545 F .2d 1351, 1372-74, 6 ELR 20732 
(4th Cir . 1978) .
141 . 40 C .F .R . §122 .3 . Query whether EPA has the authority to do so . See gener-
ally Natural Res . Def . Council, Inc . v . Costle, 568 F .2d 1369, 8 ELR 20028 
has also extended indefinitely the exemption for discharges 
composed entirely of stormwater from the §402 permit 
requirement that Congress provided only until October 1, 
1994 .142 The Article’s analysis will proceed without distin-
guishing between point sources and nonpoint sources . It 
will, however, use many of the reasons courts have used to 
make that purported distinction . But it will use them as 
factors only to determine whether a particular discharge is 
through a point source rather than to determine whether it 
is through a point source or nonpoint source .
3. The Factors Test
To deal with the difficult distinction between discharges 
by point and nonpoint sources, courts have developed 
an analysis weighing specific factors under the circum-
stances of the cases .143 They have not labeled their analy-
ses as a factors-weighing test, but the factors they use are 
clear, although the weight courts give them is not clear 
or well-articulated . Although courts have used these fac-
tors to determine whether a flow is discharged by a point 
source or a nonpoint source, they can be applied to the 
narrower question of whether a flow is discharged through 
a point source . As discussed below, the factors are whether: 
(1) human activity collects and channels stormwater flow; 
(2) a single source discharges pollutants or multiple, dis-
persed sources discharge pollutants; (3)  an artificial sys-
tem channels water; (4) an industrial or municipal activity 
produces the pollutants discharged; and (5)  the activity 
producing pollutants is more susceptible to end-of-pipe 
treatment technology and numerical effluent limitations 
or to best management practice . The first factor decides 
most cases involving stormwater flow, but is irrelevant in 
cases not involving stormwater runoff flow . Courts have 
considered the remaining factors regardless of whether 
cases involve runoff stormwater flow . By their very nature, 
factors tests are not entirely satisfactory because they do 
not always conclusively point to one answer and, therefore, 
do not produce uniform results . The less than satisfactory 
nature of a factors test to interpret “point source,” however, 
is mitigated by the list of examples in the definition, which 
point to a single answer in most cases . The factors are dis-
cussed in more detail below .
a. The Human Activity Factor
No factor is more important or cited more often in deter-
mining whether a discharge is from a point source than 
the question of whether or not human activity collects and 
(D .C . Cir . 1977) .
142 . CWA §402(p); 40 C .F .R . §122 .26(a)(9)(i) . Again, query whether EPA has 
the authority to do so . See generally Costle, 568 F .2d 1369 .
143 . EPA independently developed a more abbreviated factors test at an early 
date, but has not elaborated on it since . It wrote that discharges of pol-
lutants are by nonpoint sources when the discharges are (1)  “induced by 
natural sources”; (2) “not traceable to any discrete or identifiable facility”; 
and (3) “better controlled through the utilization of best management prac-
tices .” 44 Fed . Reg . 24700 (June 18, 1976), quoted in Northwest Envtl. Def. 
Ctr., 640 F .3d at 1075 .
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channels the flow of stormwater into navigable waters .144 If 
the stormwater is collected and channeled by human activ-
ity into navigable waters, it is usually from a point source . 
If stormwater reaches navigable water entirely through 
natural means, it is usually not from a point source . This 
reflects both legislative history and EPA’s regulatory defini-
tion of “discharge of a pollutant” to include “surface runoff 
which is collected or channeled by man  .  .  .  .”145 It should 
be remembered, however, that the statutory definition of 
point source says nothing about human activity; indeed, 
the fifth element of the §301(a) offense, “by any person,” 
independently supplies that requirement .
The meaning of the human activity factor is explored in 
greatest depth by the Fifth Circuit in Sierra Club v. Abston 
Construction Co., Inc.146 In that case, the defendant sprayed 
liquid chemicals on a pile of ore to leach gold and collected 
the leachate to extract gold from it in a laboratory . It oper-
ated a supposedly closed loop system of sumps, ditches, 
hoses, pumps, and ponds to contain, collect, and recycle the 
leachate, thus preventing it from entering navigable water . 
The liquid overflowed its restraints during a storm event, 
either because the system was undersized, inadequately 
designed, or simply malfunctioned . The operation also had 
piles of waste rock from which pollutants flowed into the 
stream in stormwater runoff . The court characterized the 
ultimate question as “whether pollutants were discharged 
from ‘discernible, confined, and discrete conveyance(s)’ 
either by gravitational or nongravitational means .”147 The 
plaintiff argued that because the original source of the pol-
lutants was from a human activity, they were added from 
a point source . The defendant argued that because the pol-
lutants were carried by rainfall and natural erosion, they 
were not from a point source, even if they were created as a 
result of human activity .
The United States, as amicus curiae, argued that because 
the “surface runoff [was] collected or channeled by the 
operator [it] constitutes a point source discharge .”148 The 
Abston court agreed with the United States . It held that:
Gravity flow, resulting in a discharge into a navigable 
body of water, may be part of a point source discharge 
if the miner at least initially collected or channeled the 
water and other materials  .   .   . [or] where miners design 
spoil piles from discarded overburden such that, during 
periods of precipitation, erosion of spoil pile walls results 
in discharges into a navigable body of water by means of 
ditches, gullies and similar conveyances  .   .   . Nothing in 
the Act relieves miners from liability simply because the 
operators did not actually construct those conveyances, 
144 . Greater Yellowstone, 628 F .3d at 1152; Cordiano v . Metacon Gun Club, 575 
F .3d 199, 221 (2d Cir . 2009); Committee to Save Mokelumne River v . East 
Bay Mun . Util . Dist ., 13 F .3d 305, 308, 24 ELR 20225 (9th Cir . 1993); 
Environmental Prot . Info . Ctr . v . Pacific Lumber Co ., 469 F . Supp . 2d 803, 
822, 37 ELR 20012 (N .D . Cal . 2007) .
145 . 40 C .F .R . §122 .2 .
146 . Sierra Club v . Abston Constr ., Inc ., 620 F .2d 41, 10 ELR 20552 (5th Cir . 
1989) .
147 . Id. at 45 .
148 . Id.
so long as they are reasonably likely to be the means by 
which pollutants are ultimately deposited into a navigable 
body of water . Conveyances of pollution formed either 
as a result of natural erosion or by material means, and 
which constitute a component of a mine drainage system, 
may fit the statutory definition .149
The court concluded that while “the point source defini-
tion ‘excludes unchanneled and uncollected surface waters,’ 
surface runoff from rainfall, when collected or channeled 
 .  .  . in connection with mining activities, constitutes point 
source pollution .”150
Overflows of stormwater from pollutant collection 
and storage systems are commonly held to be from point 
sources, even though the overflows are from storm events 
and are from facilities constructed for the purpose of col-
lecting and channeling stormwater .151 EPA regulations, 
however, may give some relief from overflows in extraor-
dinary storm events, such as its exemption of the zero 
discharge limit from CAFOs in the event of a 25-year 
storm event .152
Mining and rock piles are a type of subcategory in the 
human activity category . This factor commonly occurs 
in cases involving mining waste, especially with regard 
to runoff from rock piles of various types . The argument 
that the CWA generally exempted mining wastes from the 
§402 permit program was decisively rejected at an early 
date (1979) by the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Earth 
Sciences, Inc.153 Whether piles of rock at mining and other 
sites are point sources, however, has been a continuing 
issue and one that is fact-dependent because runoff from 
such piles results both from natural sources, such as pre-
cipitation and gravity, and human activity, such as the 
placement of the piles discussed in Abston Construction . 
The earliest decision on this issue, Appalachian Power Co. v. 
Train,154 was a challenge to EPA’s promulgation of effluent 
guidelines applicable to steam electric generating facilities . 
Industry admitted that runoff from coal piles and chemical 
handling facilities was from point sources, but argued that 
runoff from construction sites was not . It is not clear from 
the U .S . Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s opinion 
what the principled difference was, although the court held 
(at least) that the application of the guidelines to construc-
tion site runoff was sufficiently vague to vacate and remand 
that portion of the regulations . In doing so, the court did 
not reject EPA’s contention that runoff collected or chan-
neled by man was from point sources .155 Subsequent deci-
sions have found runoff from piles to be from point sources 
149 . Id.
150 . Id. at 47 .
151 . Reynolds v . Rick’s Mushroom Serv ., Inc ., 246 F . Supp . 2d 449, 456-58 
(E .D . Pa . 2003); Fishel v . Westinghouse Elec . Corp ., 640 F . Supp . 442, 
16 ELR 20634 (M .D . Pa . 1986); O’Leary v . Moyer’s Landfill, Inc ., 523 F . 
Supp . 642, 12 ELR 20239 (E .D . Pa . 1981); United States v . Oxford Royal 
Mushroom Prods ., Inc ., 487 F . Supp . 952, 10 ELR 20549 (E .D . Pa . 1980) .
152 . 40 C .F .R . §122 .23(a) .
153 . 599 F .2d 368, 371-73, 23 ELR 21526 (10th Cir . 1979); accord Trustees for 
Alaska v . EPA, 749 F .2d 549, 557-58, 15 ELR 20146 (9th Cir . 1984) .
154 . 545 F .2d 1351, 6 ELR 20732 (4th Cir . 1978) .
155 . Id. at 1373-75 .
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because the human placement of the piles dictates where 
natural gravity directs the runoff to navigable waters .156
b. The Number of Sources Factor
This factor is variously described as whether there is one 
identifiable, discrete source discharging pollutants or 
instead whether there are multiple, dispersed sources dis-
charging pollutants . Sometimes, the factor is described as 
whether pollutants are traceable to a single source .157 It is 
rooted in the legislative history distinguishing between 
point and nonpoint sources . A common comparison is 
between a factory with a pipe discharging pollutants and 
a road with thousands of vehicles leaving traces of rub-
ber, lead, and other pollutants on its surface to be carried 
to navigable water by precipitation flow . The common 
assumption courts make when using this factor is that a 
single source is susceptible to regulation by a permit, while 
multiple or dispersed sources, as a practical matter, are 
not .158 This assumption is sometimes true, but not always . 
For instance, EPA can issue general permits to multiple 
sources in the same area and subject to identical controls, 
such as oil drilling platforms in the Gulf of Mexico .159 
Congress also authorized EPA to control hundreds or 
thousands of municipal storm drains in one permit issued 
to the municipality or other jurisdiction owning them .160 
Congress gave no such authority to EPA regarding water 
pollution from vehicles or roads . In any event, a general 
permit would not help to control millions of cars, regis-
tered anywhere in the country and beyond, each leaving 
small bits of pollutants on a road . Because an automobile 
can go anywhere, it would be impossible to know what 
water quality standards its discharges must comply with 
156 . Parker v . Scrap Metal Processors, Inc ., 386 F .3d 993, 1009, 34 ELR 20104 
(11th Cir . 2004) (piles of scrap debris); Bravos v . EPA, 324 F .3d 1166, 
1169 (10th Cir . 2003) (waste rock piles at mine); Consolidation Coal Co . 
v . Costle, 604 F .2d 239, 249, 9 ELR 20511 (4th Cir . 1979) (piles of coal, 
chemical, and construction material) .
157 . Cordiano v . Metacon Gun Club, Inc ., 575 F .3d 199, 220 (2d Cir . 2009); 
League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v . 
Forsgren, 309 F .3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir . 2002) (“nonpoint source pollu-
tion  .  .  . is widely understood to  .  .  . arise[ ] from many dispersed activities 
over large areas, and is not traceable to any single discrete source”); United 
States v . Plaza Health Labs ., Inc ., 3 F .3d 643, 652, 23 ELR 21526 (2d Cir . 
1993) (Oakes, J ., dissenting) (nonpoint sources are from “runoff [occur-
ring] in diffuse patterns, over land and into navigable waters”); Trustees, 749 
F .2d at 558; Earth Sciences, 599 F .2d at 371 (“oil and gas runoffs caused by 
rainfall on the highways, are virtually impossible to isolate to one polluter, 
no permit or regulatory system was established as to them”); U .S . EPA ex 
rel . McKeown v . Port Auth . of N .Y . & N .J ., 162 F . Supp . 2d 173, 189 
(S .D .N .Y . 2001); Beartooth Alliance v . Crown Butte Mines, 904 F . Supp . 
1168, 1173, 26 ELR 20639 (D . Mont . 1995) (nonpoint source status “is 
limited to uncollected runoff water which is difficult to ascribe to a single 
polluter”); Washington Wilderness Coal . v . Hecla Mining Co ., 870 F . Supp . 
983, 988, 25 ELR 20661 (E .D . Wash . 1994) (“the touchstone for finding a 
point source is the ability to identify a discrete facility from which pollutants 
have escaped  .  .  . non-point source designation is limited to uncollected run-
off water from, for example, oil and gasoline on a highway, which is difficult 
to ascribe to a single polluter”) .
158 . “Because [nonpoint source pollution] arises in such a diffuse way, it is very 
difficult to regulate through individual permits .” League of Wilderness De-
fenders, 309 F .3d at 1184 . See also Earth Sciences, 599 F .2d at 371 .
159 . 40 C .F .R . §122 .28 .
160 . CWA §402(p)(3)(B)(i) .
or to know which state must certify that its operation will 
meet the state’s standards under CWA §401 . By those 
standards, the road itself or its drainage system, however, 
would be susceptible to control by CWA individual or gen-
eral permits . Indeed, roads would be in a better position to 
capture and control such pollutants than vehicles using the 
roads . But, as discussed above, roads are not conveyances 
of pollutants to navigable waters in the sense contemplated 
for point sources, although their drainage ditches may be .
The Supreme Court skirted the issue in Decker v. North-
west Environmental Defense Center,161 holding, on the basis 
of EPA’s interpretation of its industrial stormwater regula-
tion and its silviculture point source regulation, that col-
lected and channeled runoff discharges from logging roads 
were not from point sources . The focus of the decision and 
the largest point of contention among the Justices was 
the appropriateness of the almost complete deference that 
courts give to an agency’s interpretations of its own regu-
lations, following Auer v. Robbins .162 Chief Justice John 
Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito concurred in Decker, 
but suggested that the Court should reconsider Auer . Jus-
tice Antonin Scalia dissented on this part of the decision, 
asserting that the Court should reconsider and overturn 
Auer and that without deference to EPA’s interpretation of 
its own regulation, runoff from the logging roads collected 
and channeled by pipes, ditches, and channels to naviga-
ble waters would be discharged from point sources . Both 
the majority opinion163 and Justice Scalia’s dissent164 pro-
vide detailed analyses of CWA §402(p) and EPA’s indus-
161 . 133 S . Ct . 1326, 43 ELR 20062 (2013) .
162 . 519 U .S . 410 (1997) .
163 . The majority opinion, authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, begins with 
the proposition that §402(p) exempts discharges composed entirely of 
stormwater from requiring §402 permits, except for discharges “associated 
with an industrial activity,” §402(p)(2)(B) . The majority’s analysis failed 
to note that the exemption expired in 1994 . It stated that the CWA did 
not define “industrial activity,” but EPA did so in its industrial stormwater 
regulation, 40 C .F .R . §22 .26(b)(14), defining “associated with an industrial 
activity” to include discharges of stormwater “directly related to manufac-
turing, processing or raw materials storage areas in an industrial plant  .  .  . 
includ[ing]  .  .  . storm water discharges from  .  .  . immediate access roads  .  .  . 
used or traveled by carriers of raw materials, manufactured products, waste 
materials, or by-products used or created by the facility  .  .  .  .” EPA interpret-
ed the phrase to include only traditional industrial operations like sawmills 
and other fixed and permanent operations, as opposed to logging operations 
that were outdoor and impermanent . The majority noted that under Auer, 
courts must defer to an agency’s interpretation of its regulations if the inter-
pretation is reasonable; it need not be the only or the best interpretation in 
order to warrant deference . The majority found EPA’s interpretation to be 
reasonable and accordingly granted it deference .
164 . Justice Scalia starts by casting doubt on whether the discharges are exempted 
by §402(p)(a) because stormwater discharges are not “‘natural runoff’ when 
they are channeled through manmade pipes and ditches, and carry with 
them manmade pollutants, from manmade forest roads .” Decker, 133 S . Ct . 
at 1326, 1342 (Scalia, J ., dissenting) . Even if it were, however, §402(p)’s 
recapture provision for stormwater associated with industrial activities, as 
interpreted by EPA’s regulation, 40 C .F .R . §122 .27(b)(1), covers SIC Code 
24, the forest products industry, including Group 2411, “Logging,” for es-
tablishments primarily engaged in cutting timber, whose primary product 
is logs . “That,” wrote Justice Scalia, “I would think, is that .” Decker, 133 S . 
Ct . at 1343 (Scalia, J ., dissenting) . Cutting timber simply does not involve a 
fixed and permanent facility as argued by EPA . That addressed EPA’s indus-
trial stormwater regulation, but not its amended silvicultural point source 
definition consisting of four particular operations, which Justice Scalia ap-
parently concluded, without analysis, was within EPA’s authority .
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trial stormwater and silviculture regulations, 40 C .F .R . 
§§122 .26 and 122 .27 . The majority’s focus on EPA’s inter-
pretation of regulations applied to particular silvicultural 
activities diminishes the force of its decision on the general 
issue of whether road ditches are point sources . Justice Sca-
lia’s dissent, however, focuses precisely on that issue, as well 
as on an exhaustive analysis of the regulations . His analysis 
on the general question is straightforward and persuasive 
and very much leaves open the question of whether road 
ditches and similar stormwater drainage systems are point 
sources, although they may be exempted from regulation 
by §402(p) . While this factor is not dispositive in all cases, 
it is useful .
c. The Artificial System Factor
The “artificial” part of this factor duplicates and adds noth-
ing to the first human activity factor . The “system” part 
of the factor, however, adds a new consideration that has 
been useful in some cases . A few courts have used this fac-
tor to decide that the addition of pollutants was not from 
a point source . None of them involve precipitation run-
off, but the factor could be easily used in runoff cases . In 
United States v. Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc.,165 the U .S . 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a per-
son is not a point source, at least not in a criminal case 
under the rule of lenity . Although the decision used many 
interpretive devices, its primary focus was on the word-
ing of the definition of point source and the examples it 
includes, commenting that they “evoke images of physical 
structures and instrumentalities that systematically act as 
a means of conveying pollutants from an industrial source 
to navigable waters”166 as opposed to the “myriad, random 
acts of human waste disposal, for example, a passerby who 
flings a candy wrapper into the Hudson River, or a urinat-
ing swimmer .”167 The decision as a whole is questionable, as 
we will examine in detail below . If the Second Circuit had 
made the observation that all of the examples given in the 
definition of point source are inanimate, while a person is 
animate, it would have made a pertinent observation . But 
to conclude that the definition suggests that point sources 
are only physical structures that systematically convey pol-
lutants from an industrial source is overblown . The first 
and most common examples of a point source, pipes, 
commonly carry municipal, commercial, and agricultural 
waste as well as industrial waste .
In Hudson Riverkeeper Fund, Inc. v. Harbor at Hastings 
Associates,168 the plaintiff alleged that trash falling from 
an abandoned and dilapidated building into an adjacent 
river violated CWA §301(a) because the building was a 
point source . The Southern District of New York cited the 
above-quoted language from Plaza Health and summar-
ily held that the building was not a point source because 
165 . 3 F .3d 643, 23 ELR 21526 (2d Cir . 1993) .
166 . Id. at 646 .
167 . Id. at 647 .
168 . 917 F . Supp . 251, 26 ELR 21120 (S .D .N .Y . 1996) .
“the discharge of material” from it “would not be deliber-
ate or systematic .”169 If the court meant that an addition 
must be intentional for it to be from a point source, it is 
simply wrong . The Supreme Court has held that passive 
owners of point sources are liable for additions of pol-
lutants to navigable waters from their point sources .170 
Moreover, civil liability under the CWA is commonly 
held to be strict171 and even criminal liability may be 
negligent .172 What the court meant by “systematic” is not 
clear . Perhaps, it meant the complained-of action must 
be continuing rather than a one-time event . That inter-
pretation is wrong as well, for spills are one-time events 
and unpermitted spills of pollutants from point sources 
violate the statute .173 Indeed, the CWA requires EPA to 
develop best management practices to prevent spills, for 
inclusion in permits to industrial dischargers .174
Several other decisions used the system approach to 
determine that a facility was a point source . In Frobel v. 
Meyer, the U .S . Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit, citing the Second Circuit’s Plaza Health decision, 
commented that point source “connotes the terminal end 
of an artificial system for moving water waste, or other 
materials .”175 The Tenth Circuit in Earth Sciences answered, 
in part, an argument that an overflowing sump was not a 
point source by commenting that “[w]e have no problem 
finding a point source here . The undisputed facts demon-
strate the combination of sumps, ditches, hoses and pumps 
is a circulating or drainage system to serve this mining 
operation .”176 The Fifth Circuit in Abston Construction later 
held that “[c]onveyances of pollution formed either as a 
result of natural erosion or by material means, and which 
constitute a component of a mine drainage system, may fit 
into the statutory definition” of point source .177 In Williams 
Pipe Line Co. v. Bayer Corp., an Iowa district court held 
that an oil pipeline facility was a point source .178 Another 
district court in North Carolina Shellfish Growers Ass’n v. 
169 . Id. at 257 .
170 . South Fla . Water Mgmt . Dist . v . Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U .S . 95, 
104-05, 34 ELR 20021 (2004) .
171 . Stoddard v . Western Carolina Regional Sewer Auth ., 784 F .2d 1200, 1208, 
16 ELR 20503 (4th Cir . 1986); Sierra Club v . Abston Constr . Co ., Inc ., 620 
F .2d 41, 45, 10 ELR 20552 (5th Cir . 1980); United States v . Earth Sciences, 
Inc ., 599 F .2d 368, 374, 23 ELR 21526 (10th Cir . 1979); West Virginia 
Highlands Conservancy, Inc . v . Huffman, 651 F . Supp . 2d 512, 519, 39 
ELR 20201 (S .D . W . Va . 2009); Fishel v . Westinghouse Elec . Corp ., 640 F . 
Supp . 442, 446, 16 ELR 20634 (M .D . Pa . 1986) .
172 . CWA §309(c)(1) .
173 . See, e.g., United States v . Hamel, 551 F .2d 107, 7 ELR 20253 (6th Cir . 
1977); Williams Pipe Line Co . v . Bayer Corp ., 964 F . Supp . 1300 (S .D . 
Iowa 1997) .
174 . CWA §304(e) .
175 . 217 F .3d 928, 30 ELR 20746 (7th Cir . 2000) . In this case the county in-
completely dismantled a deteriorated dam . Predictably, the current in the 
stream carried sediment accumulated behind the dam, depositing it on 
gravel bars and native aquatic plants downstream, destroying the natural 
habitat of the stream . The plaintiff’s theory was that the remains of the dam 
and the channel through which the sediment flowed were a point source . At 
that point the nonexistent dam was the terminal end of nothing and was 
not a conveyance .
176 . Earth Sciences, 599 F .2d at 374 .
177 . Sierra Club v . Abston Constr . Co ., Inc ., 620 F .2d 41, 45, 10 ELR 20552 
(5th Cir . 1980) .
178 . Williams Pipe Line Co., 964 F . Supp . at 1318-20 .
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Holly Ridge Associates found that an entire tract of land was 
a point source when it contained an “extensive network of 
seventeen ditches specifically designed to concentrate and 
accelerate the flow of stormwater from the track .”179 Finally, 
in Reynolds v. Rick’s Mushroom Service, Inc., a Pennsylvania 
district court found that a mushroom farmer’s point source 
included his whole system to prevent the discharge of pol-
lutants, consisting of “land gradations, berms   .   .   .  , sedi-
mentation basin, the wasterwater impoundment, and the 
sprayer system .”180
d. The Nature of the Polluting Activity 
Factor
In Plaza Health, the Second Circuit concluded from both 
the structure of the CWA181 and its legislative history182 
that the §402 permitting program was designed to regu-
late industrial and municipal waste, not agricultural or 
random human waste . It used that conclusion to support 
its ruling that human beings are not point sources .183 Later, 
in another context, the same circuit commented that non-
point sources came, in part, from agricultural use of land 
adjacent to a river .184 These comments are loosely in accord 
with the legislative history, which suggests industrial and 
municipal waste are regulated by the §402 permit pro-
gram, but agricultural waste is not because it was nonpoint 
source in nature . This interpretation is overly simplified . 
The definition of point source includes CAFOs, which are 
agricultural in nature . Moreover, the exemptions for agri-
cultural pollution are limited to “agricultural stormwater 
discharges” and “return flows from irrigated agriculture .”185 
While these are broad-reaching exemptions, they do not 
include everything discharged from a farm . Moreover, 
there are many categories of activity that generate pol-
lutants, beyond industrial, municipal, and agricultural . 
Commercial activities with point source dischargers, such 
as developing photographic film and prints, are regulated 
by the CWA permit program .186 Plaza Health’s conclusion, 
therefore, is erroneous . Indeed, some courts have rejected 
it altogether . The Ninth Circuit, in Greater Yellowstone 
Coalition v. Lewis, said “point and nonpoint sources are 
not distinguished by the kind of pollution they cause or 
by the activity causing the pollution, but rather by whether 
the pollution reaches the water through a confined, dis-
crete conveyance .”187 The analytical factor that focuses on 
the nature of the polluting activity does not appear to be a 
useful one .
179 . 278 F . Supp . 2d 654, 681 (E .D .N .C . 2003) .
180 . 246 F . Supp . 2d 449, 457-58 (E .D . Pa . 2003) .
181 . United States v . Plaza Health Labs ., Inc ., 3 F .3d 643, 646, 23 ELR 21526 
(2d Cir . 1993) .
182 . Id. at 647 .
183 . The reasoning of this decision is questionable and will be examined in de-
tail below .
184 . Natural Res . Def . Council, Inc ., v . Muszynski, 268 F .3d 91 (2d Cir . 2001) .
185 . CWA §502(14) . 
186 . 40 C .F .R . pt . 459 .
187 . 638 F .3d 1143, 1152, 41 ELR 20059 (9th Cir . 2010) (quoting Trustees for 
Alaska v . EPA, 749 F .2d 549, 558, 15 ELR 20146 (9th Cir . 1984)) .
e. The Appropriate Control Factor
This factor also is rooted in the legislative history, which 
suggests that the §402 permit program was designed for 
point sources, for which uniform national technology-
based standards for similar facilities, expressible in num-
bers, are appropriate . The legislative history also suggests 
that the §402 permit program was not designed for non-
point sources, for which climate and geography vary so 
greatly that they are not susceptible to uniform standards 
and are more amenable to control by best management 
practices than by technology . While this is a useful dis-
tinction, it is somewhat vague . Is intercepting sediment 
at a construction site by placing bales of hay in the path 
of the flow of stormwater a best management practice 
or a use of primitive “hay bale” technology? Moreover, 
as we have already discussed, it is possible to intercept 
most runoff by trenches and ditches leading the runoff to 
sedimentation basins or more effective treatment tech-
nologies . The issue is largely one of cost, both in dollars 
and in land use . Cost is one of the factors that EPA must 
use in developing and promulgating effluent guidelines 
for industries .188
The Ninth Circuit has commented that the reason for 
the CWA’s focus on point sources rather than nonpoint 
sources “is simply that ‘[d]ifferences in climate and geog-
raphy make nationwide uniformity in controlling non-
point pollution virtually impossible . Also, the control of 
non-point source pollution often depends on land use con-
trols, which are traditionally state or local in nature .’”189 
The latter point is overstated . Most pollution control does 
not restrict the uses of our land, but rather tells us how we 
must conduct some of those uses to avoid injuring others 
or society as a whole . Land use control is telling a contrac-
tor what he can or cannot build on his land, not that he 
must place bales of hay to intercept sediment flowing in 
rainwater during active construction . Requiring sediment 
control at construction sites to prevent pollution discharges 
to navigable water is not inherently a state or local interest . 
How and where the bales of hay are placed at a construc-
tion site to best contain sediment is entirely a local matter, 
dictated by the topography of the site .
At issue in League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Moun-
tains Biodiversity Project v. Forsgren190 was whether spray-
ing pesticides from an aircraft’s spray bar on rivers in a 
national forest required a §402 permit . The Ninth Circuit 
easily concluded that the spraying apparatus was a dis-
crete conveyance . The U .S . Forest Service, however, noted 
that EPA’s regulations defining silvicultural point sources 
excluded “non-point source activities such as  .  .  . pest and 
fire control  .  .  . from which there is natural runoff”191 and 
argued the exclusion included spraying pesticides for pest 
188 . CWA §304(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(B), & (b)(4)(B) .
189 . Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v . U .S . Forest Serv ., 550 F .3d 778, 785, 39 
ELR 20297 (9th Cir . 2008) (quoting Marc R . Poirier, Non-Point Source Pol-
lution, in Envt’l . Practice Guide §18 .13 (2008)) .
190 . 309 F .3d 1181 (9th Cir . 2002) .
191 . 40 C .F .R . §122 .27(b)(1) .
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control . The court noted that the regulation excluded only 
nonpoint sources from which there is natural runoff . Since 
there is no natural runoff from aerial application of pes-
ticides directly onto water, the general understanding of 
nonpoint sources did not apply and therefore the regula-
tory exclusion of point source did not apply . The court 
also noted that the preamble to EPA’s silvicultural point 
source definition identified three characteristics of non-
point sources: (1) precipitation flow; (2) number of sources; 
and (3) “better controlled through  .   .   . best management 
practices”192 than by end-of-pipe treatment . The best con-
trol of spraying pesticides over water is to “just say no,” an 
end-of-pipe control .193 The U .S . Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit held in National Cotton Council v. U.S. EPA 
that an aerial pesticide spray apparatus was a point source 
in part because it was controllable at the source .194 Other 
decisions consider the silviculture point source regulations 
in different contexts .195
f. The Curious Tales of Dams and Ditches
Dams and ditches are conveyances of both stormwater 
runoff and non-stormwater runoff . Flood control dams 
impound stormwater to control flooding, while other 
dams have nothing to do with stormwater, such as run-
of-the-river dams generating electricity . Some ditches 
control stormwater, such as the roadside drainage systems 
discussed above, while other ditches have nothing to do 
with stormwater, such as ditches carrying water destined 
for irrigation . Ditches are included in the list of point 
source examples; dams are not . There are thousands of 
each, enough to present formidable challenges for the lim-
ited resources of permit writers . On the other hand, both 
can contribute to the degradation of water quality . Each 
presents a unique interpretive issue .
Dams carry pollutants from upstream waters to down-
stream waters and they certainly are discernible, confined, 
and discrete . Thus, even run-of-the-river dams seem to be 
point sources . Power-generating dams that convey water 
through pipes, sluices, and tunnels through turbines and 
ultimately to downstream waters, even more clearly are or 
include discernible, confined, and discrete conveyances . At 
the outset of the §402 permit program, EPA made a deci-
sion that dams did not require permits . The Agency did so 
for policy reasons . The acknowledged reason was that the 
large number of dams would overwhelm permit writers, 
although few presented real water quality issues . The unspo-
ken reason may have been that many dams were owned 
and operated by the federal government or were already 
subject to federal permit programs that involved environ-
192 . Wilderness Defenders, 309 F .3d at 1188 .
193 . Indeed, EPA is directed to promulgate technology-based effluent guidelines 
for many industrial sources requiring elimination of discharges altogether if 
“technologically and economically achievable .” §301(b)(2)(B) .
194 . 553 F .3d 927, 940, 39 ELR 20006 (6th Cir . 2009) .
195 . See Decker v . Northwest Envtl . Def . Ctr ., 133 S . Ct . 1326, 43 ELR 20062 
(2013); Environmental Prot . Info . Ctr . v . Pacific Lumber Col, 469 F . Supp . 
2d 803, 37 ELR 20012 (N .D . Cal . 2007) .
mental review and control .196 The National Wildlife Fed-
eration sued EPA challenging its determination that dams 
were not covered by the §402 permit program; the plaintiff 
alleged that the Agency lacked the authority to declare that 
point sources adding pollutants to navigable waters did 
not require §402 permits . The D .C . Circuit upheld EPA’s 
determination in National Wildlife Federation v. Gor-
such.197 While it might be assumed that this decision held 
that dams are not point sources, it did not so hold . Instead, 
EPA conceded that under some circumstances, dams could 
be point sources,198 and the court held that dams did not 
add pollutants to downstream waters . Courts today largely 
discount the decision because it accorded Chevron defer-
ence where none was due .199 All other decisions considering 
the issue of whether dams are point sources have held that 
they are, at least under the facts of the cases .
Ditches present particular interpretive issues because 
they are listed as an example of a point source but also hold 
bodies of water, including stormwater runoff that could 
be waters of the United States, possibly meaning that they 
satisfy two elements of the discharge of pollutants offense . 
Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality in Rapanos v. United 
States, suggested that ditches could not be navigable water, 
in part because they were designated as point sources by 
the CWA .200 He admitted that the two could overlap on 
occasion, but stated that they could not do so generally .201 
The problem with this analysis, however, is that ditches are 
man-made trenches in the earth, not bodies of water: They 
convey water; they are not water . This was a central point 
in National Association of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers,202 where the petitioner challenged a nation-
wide permit because it applied to some ditches; ditches 
could not be waters of the United States because they were 
point sources; and the two terms are mutually exclusive . 
The D .C . Circuit noted that the plurality in Rapanos did 
not declare that “a point source, such as a ditch, can never 
be a navigable water under the CWA .”203 It also noted that 
a number of courts had held that ditches were navigable 
waters204 and the courts that held otherwise did so on the 
196 . Environmental review was required for all major federal actions signifi-
cantly affecting the environment under the National Environmental Pol-
icy Act (NEPA), 42 U .S .C . §§4321-4370f, ELR Stat . NEPA §§2-209 . 
Section 401 of the CWA also required federal permit-issuing agencies to 
secure from the state in which federal projects, or federally licensed proj-
ects, were undertaken a certification that the project would meet state 
water quality standards . These statutory provisions, however, would not 
address water quality problems from existing dams .
197 . 693 F .2d 156, 13 ELR 20015 (1982) .
198 . Id. at 165 .
199 . See generally Chevron U .S .A ., Inc . v . Natural Res . Def . Council, Inc ., 467 
U .S . 837, 14 ELR 20507 (1984) .
200 . 547 U .S . 715, 735, 36 ELR 20116 (2006) .
201 . Rapanos, 547 U .S . at 735-36 (The statutory definitions of “point source” 
and “navigable waters” suggests that they are “separate and distinct cate-
gories .” It “would make little sense if the two categories were significantly 
overlapping .” Therefore, ditches “by and large” are point sources and not 
navigable waters .) .
202 . 669 F . Supp . 2d 209, 215, 40 ELR 20104 (D .C . Cir . 2010) .
203 . Id.at 216 .
204 . Parker v . Scrap Metal Processors, Inc ., 386 F .3d 993, 1009, 34 ELR 20104 
(11th Cir . 2004); United States v . Deaton, 332 F .3d 698 (4th Cir . 2003); 
Treacy v . Newdunn Assocs ., 344 F .3d 407 (4th Cir . 2003) .
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facts rather than as a matter of law .205 Indeed, Justice Scalia 
subsequently concluded that ditches could be point sourc-
es .206 Despite the controversy, both dams and ditches con-
vey pollutants and are or can be point sources .
4. Point Source Issues Not Involving 
Precipitation Flow
Most of the decisions above concerned discharges of 
stormwater flow in which the distinction between point 
and nonpoint sources depended on the degree of human 
involvement in the discharge . In cases that were not clear, 
the courts developed the other factors to make that deter-
mination . In most point source decisions, however, storm-
water flow is irrelevant . For example, when bulldozers push 
fill material into wetlands, the issue of whether bulldozers 
operating in that capacity are point sources has nothing to 
do with stormwater flow . In these decisions, courts primar-
ily analyze whether the alleged point source is a “discern-
ible, confined, and discrete conveyance” of pollutants and 
whether it is one of the examples listed in the definition 
or is analogous to them . Courts often use precedent and 
the broad interpretation canon of construction . They may 
also use one or more of the factors discussed above . This 
section discusses the cases that either fall into broad cat-
egories, have precedents on both sides of the issue, or raise 
particularly interesting issues .
a. Vehicles on or in Land, Water, and Air
By far, the largest number of non-runoff decisions concern 
whether the defendants’ vehicles are point sources . All of 
them hold that vehicles are point sources . Typically, courts 
do so by reciting that point source is interpreted broadly 
and by citing a precedent or two, often Avoyelles Sportsmen’s 
League v. Marsh .207 They probably cite Avoyelles because it 
is the earliest appellate court decision holding bulldozers 
and backhoes to be point sources, not because its analysis 
is exhaustive .208 Despite the absence of analytical attention 
to the issue, the courts are undoubtedly correct . Vehicles 
fit precisely within the definition as “discernible, confined 
and discrete conveyance[s] .” The very purpose of vehicles is 
to convey people and material . The list of examples given in 
the definition includes “rolling stock” and “vessel or other 
floating craft,” vehicles whose purposes are to convey peo-
205 . F .D . & P . Enters ., Inc . v . Army Corps of Eng’rs, 239 F . Supp . 2d 509, 514 
(D .N .J . 2003); Haniszewski v . Cadby, 2009 WL 316723 (W .D .N .Y . 2009) .
206 . “The stormwater here was discharged from logging roads through a series 
of pipes, ditches, and channels—all items expressly named in the definition 
[of ‘point source’] .” Decker v . Northwest Envtl . Def . Ctr ., 133 S . Ct . 1326, 
1344, 43 ELR 20062 (2013) (Scalia, J ., dissenting) .
207 . 715 F .2d 897, 922, 13 ELR 20942 (5th Cir . 1983) .
208 . The Fifth Circuit’s analysis was, in fact, cursory . “[B]ulldozers and backhoes 
were point sources, since they collected into windrows and piles material 
that may ultimately find its way back into the waters .” Avoyelles, 715 F .2d at 
922 . It cited United States v. Holland, 373 F . Supp . 665, 668, 4 ELR 20710 
(M .D . Fla . 1074), in which a Florida district court found that the point 
source element of CWA §301(a) was satisfied because defendant admitted 
that he had “discharged from point sources, including dump trucks, drag 
lines and bulldozers .”
ple and materials on land and water . Although other types 
of terrestrial vehicles and aircraft are not listed, the nonex-
haustive list includes the mentioned examples; it does not 
exclude others . Unlisted terrestrial vehicles and aircraft are 
conveyances and are analogous to rolling stock and vessels .
It was held fairly early in the §402 permit program that 
Navy aircraft dropping ordnance into coastal waters dur-
ing bombing practice were point sources, with no analy-
sis of the definitional issue .209 Subsequent cases under 
the CWA in which aircraft (and sometimes trucks) were 
alleged to be point sources involve aircraft spraying pesti-
cides into water . It is not always clear whether the aircraft 
(or trucks) or the spray bars attached to them were alleged 
to be the point sources . In either event, courts held the 
vehicles or the spray apparatus to be point sources, with 
little analysis .210
The problem with this easy analysis is that passen-
ger vehicles generally, and automobiles in particular, are 
conveyances and therefore point sources . If so, why aren’t 
the owners of such vehicles liable for their deposits of oil, 
grease, and rubber residue on roads that are ultimately dis-
charged into navigable waters by precipitation flow? Here, 
a return to the definitions of “discharge of a pollutant” and 
“point source” are useful . Reordering the elements in the 
statute somewhat, §301(a) regulates the addition by con-
veyances of pollutants to navigable waters . It focuses on 
point sources as conveyances of pollutants rather than as 
the origins of pollutants . Most of the examples of point 
sources in the definition emphasize this . We think of the 
first, “pipe,” as carrying pollutants, not creating them . 
CAFOs are the big anomaly in the list, but they are an 
anomaly in the definition for several reasons, which we will 
discuss below .
Finally, automobile-produced pollutants are not suscep-
tible to regulation by the §402 permit program . They are 
classic multiple and dispersed sources, too many in number 
209 . “It would be a strained construction of unambiguous language for the court 
to interpret that the release or firing of ordnance from aircraft into the navi-
gable waters of Viequis [an island off the coast of Puerto Rico] is not ‘any 
addition of any pollutant  .  .  . from any point source,’” Barcelo v . Brown, 478 
F . Supp . 646, 664 (D .P .R . 1979) . The Supreme Court, on appeal from the 
First Circuit’s reversal of the district court on other grounds, stated, without 
comment, that the district court held “the release of ordnance from aircraft 
or from ships into navigable waters is a discharge of pollutants .” Weinberger 
v . Romero Barcelo, 456 U .S . 305, 309, 12 ELR 20538 (1982) .
210 . Peconic Baykeeper, Inc . v . Suffolk County, 600 F .3d 180, 40 ELR 20098 
(2d Cir . 2010) . The district court had held that the spray applicators at-
tached to trucks and aircraft were not point sources because they discharged 
into air rather than into water . The Second Circuit made use of the broad 
interpretation canon of construction and the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in 
League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Fors-
gren, 309 F .3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir . 2002), to reverse . “Here, the spray 
apparatus was attached to trucks and helicopters, and was the source of 
the discharge . The pesticides were discharged ‘from’ the source, and not 
from the air  .  .  .  . The District Court’s conclusion that the pesticides were 
not discharged from a point source was in error .” Peconic Baykeeper, 600 
F .3d at 188-89 . In National Cotton Council of America v. U.S. EPA, 553 
F .3d 927, 940, 39 ELR 20006 (6th Cir . 2009), the parties assumed that 
aerial pesticide spraying was from point sources, but EPA contended that 
the point sources did not add pollutants because they sprayed pesticides, not 
pollutants . The court rejected that argument . See also Forsgren, 309 F .3d at 
1185 (“[A]n airplane fitted with tanks and mechanical spraying apparatus is 
a ‘discrete conveyance .’”) .
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for EPA to control by permits . They do not convey pollut-
ants to water . They are not susceptible to end-of-pipe treat-
ment technology . There’s not much end-of-pipe technology 
that an automobile owner or driver can apply to stop leav-
ing bits of her tires on the highway . Although end-of-pipe 
technology may treat pollutants coming from the tailpipes 
of motor vehicles, those emissions are already comprehen-
sively regulated by the Clean Air Act (CAA), both in terms 
of end-of-pipe and internal technology and fuel content .211 
If the technology-based standards required to be applied in 
permits to point sources under the CWA are not possible or 
appropriate, the other source of effluent limitations in the 
CWA, water quality standards, are not possible or appro-
priate either for they are developed on a local basis and we 
don’t know what waters any particular motor vehicle’s pol-
lutants will enter . The only decision to consider this issue 
did so in a case alleging that tollbooths on a highway were 
point sources, U.S. EPA ex rel. McKeown v. Port Author-
ity of New York & New Jersey .212 The court held that the 
vehicles passing through the tollbooths were “the sources 
of the pollutants complained of” and that they were “air 
emissions and not water pollutants,” emissions regulated 
by the Clean Air Act rather than the CWA .213
b. People and Other Animals
In United States v. Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc .,214 the 
Second Circuit considered the question of “whether a 
human being can be a point source”215 and held that the 
CWA “was never designed to address the random, indi-
vidual polluter .”216 The court began its analysis with the 
statutory definition of point source, which the court noted 
did not include human beings in its list of examples . More-
over, the court found that the examples “evoke images of 
physical structures and instrumentalities that systemati-
cally act as a means of conveying pollutants from an indus-
trial source to navigable waterways .”217 It also noted that 
“by any person” is already an element in a §301(a) violation 
and, therefore, reading point source to include a person 
would make “point source” and “by any person” duplica-
tive . Such an interpretation would make the violation read, 
“the addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any 
person by any person shall be unlawful,’ and this simply 
makes no sense .”218 If the court had stopped there, its inter-
pretation of point source would have been well-analyzed, if 
not unassailable .219
211 . 42 U .S .C . §§7401-7671q, ELR Stat . CAA §§101-618; see 42 U .S .C . 
§§7521-7589 .
212 . 162 F . Supp . 2d 173, 189 (S .D .N .Y . 2001) .
213 . Id.
214 . 3 F .3d 643, 23 ELR 21526 (2d Cir . 1993) .
215 . Id. at 645 .
216 . Id. at 646 .
217 . Id.
218 . Id. at 647 .
219 . The issues with its interpretation thus far relate to its comments that the 
examples of point source in the definition are physical structures and struc-
tures that convey pollutants from industrial sources . Many of the examples, 
such as “pipe,” do evoke such images . However, others, such as “channel” 
The court next analyzed the statute and its legislative 
history to demonstrate that the CWA was designed to 
regulate industrial and municipal waste, not the random 
polluting acts of individuals . First, the court listed a num-
ber of sections dealing with point sources,220 implying that 
those sections deal exclusively with industrial and munici-
pal discharges . They do not . They sometimes distinguish 
between municipal and other point sources .221 But for the 
most part, they apply to all point sources, without lim-
iting themselves to industrial point sources . The court 
proceeded to legislative history, which it also concluded 
focuses on industrial polluters .222 For that conclusion, it 
cited a Senate report that distinguished between point 
and nonpoint sources223 and a floor statement by Senator 
Dole suggesting that all agricultural discharges, including 
CAFO discharges, are nonpoint source pollution .224 These 
authorities do not support the Second Circuit’s conclusion 
that Congress did not intend the CWA to include human 
beings as point sources . Indeed, the suggestion by Senator 
Dole that CAFOs are not point sources is simply wrong, 
undercutting whatever credibility his statement has . The 
court then noted the absence of case law or EPA regula-
tions suggesting that human beings are point sources . Of 
course, there was no case or regulatory law that people are 
not point sources .
Finally, the court observed that holding a human being 
to be a point source would lead to the absurd result that 
“a passerby who flings a candy wrapper into the Hudson 
River, or a urinating swimmer” would violate the stat-
ute .225 These images are easily distinguished from the facts 
in Plaza Health, where the defendant took waste from 
the commercial testing of blood at his laboratory in vials, 
which he placed below the high-water line in a bulkhead 
so that they would be removed by high tide . This was not 
a kid throwing a candy wrapper in the water, but instead 
the principal of a commercial activity evading the costs of 
proper disposal of medical waste by secretly disposing of it 
in navigable waters; his very secrecy is persuasive evidence 
of his knowing wrongdoing .
In Oregon Natural Desert Association v. Dombeck, the 
Ninth Circuit, citing Plaza Health as its only author-
ity, stated that “[i]t would be strange indeed to classify 
as a point source something as inherently mobile as a 
cow” and held “the term ‘point source’ does not include 
and “discrete fissure” do not, particularly if physical structures are equated 
with human-made structures, for channels and fissures occur in nature .
220 . CWA §§301, 301(e), 301(g)(2), 304(b)(4)(B), 306, 308(a), 308(c), & 
402(f ) .
221 . CWA §301(b), for example, deals specifically with municipal point sources, 
see §301(b)(1)(B), (h), (i) & (j), while the remainder deal with point sources 
generally, not specifying industrial point sources . Section 306 requires EPA 
to promulgate standards for new sources for at least 27 categories of point 
sources, many of which are manufacturing facilities . These are industrial 
facilities . But the list includes a number of food-processing facilities . Query 
whether they are industrial facilities? EPA has promulgated technology-
based standards for a number of commercial facilities, such as the develop-
ment of photographic film and prints in 40 C .F .R . pt . 459 .
222 . 3 F .3d at 647 .
223 . Id.
224 . Id.
225 . Id.
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a human being or any other animal .”226 Ten years later, 
the circuit court cited that decision as good authority in 
Oregon Natural Desert Association v. U.S. Forest Service.227 
Both cases were challenges to grazing licenses on federal 
land without CWA §401 certifications on the theory 
that cattle were point sources that would pollute streams 
and the granting of the licenses were federal actions that 
required §401 certification .
Humans can be conveyances . When we take clean 
laundry from the dryer and carry it to the bedroom, we 
are conveyances of clean clothes . Animals can be convey-
ances; horses are an obvious example . Both are discern-
ible, confined, and discrete conveyances . As Judge Oakes 
pointed out in his strong dissent in Plaza Health, the hold-
ing that humans cannot be point sources opens a gaping 
door for evasion of the CWA’s prescription simply by hav-
ing employees form a bucket brigade from a pollutant-pro-
ducing facility to the river in place of a pipe .228 Stripped of 
its erroneous arguments, the court in Plaza Health could 
have come plausibly to the opposite conclusion, as the dis-
sent did . Unfortunately, the government poorly argued the 
case . If the government had argued that the vials, as con-
tainers, were the point sources, then the issue of humans 
as point sources would not have arisen . Indeed, the dis-
trict court noted that there was an alternative to humans 
as point sources in the case: The fissures in the bulkhead 
into which the defendant inserted vials of blood to be 
washed away by the rising tide could be considered as point 
sources, thus removing the issue of whether humans could 
be point sources .229
c. CAFOs, Fish-Raising Facilities, and Other 
Agricultural Discharges
The definition of point source specifically provides that 
“agricultural stormwater discharges” and “return flows 
from irrigated agriculture” are not point sources and that 
a CAFO is a point source . Unless flowing water is a point 
source, however, agricultural stormwater discharges and 
return flows from irrigated agriculture cannot be point 
sources, even in the absence of the statutory exemption, 
because flowing water is not a conveyance; flowing water is 
carried by a conveyance . To give those exemptions mean-
ing, they must be applied to additions of pollutants from 
agricultural stormwater and return flows from irrigation 
agriculture by point sources . Stormwater flow and irriga-
tion return flow may include groundwater that originates 
in irrigation by flooding .230
226 . 172 F .3d 1092, 28 ELR 21471 (9th Cir . 1998) .
227 . 550 F .3d 778, 782, 39 ELR 20297 (9th Cir . 2008) .
228 . The district court opinion, United States v. Villegas, 784 F . Supp . 6, 8-11, 22 
ELR 21027 (E .D .N .Y . 1991), rev’d sub nom. United States v. Plaza Health 
Labs., Inc., 3 F .3d 643, 23 ELR 21526 (2d Cir . 1993), is extremely well-
analyzed, using more interpretive devices than any other decision in this 
Article . See infra tbl . B .
229 . Villegas, 784 F . Supp . at 10 .
230 . Fishermen Against Destruction of Env’t, Inc . v . Closter Farms, Inc ., 300 
F .3d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir . 2002) .
Are CAFOs regulated because they are point sources, 
or are they exempted if they deposit their waste into navi-
gable waters through stormwater flows or irrigation return 
flows? If pollutants from CAFOs enter navigable water by 
means other than stormwater flow or irrigation return flow, 
for instance in a stream flowing through the CAFO, then 
the exemptions do not come into play . But if pollutants 
from the CAFO are discharged to navigable water only 
by stormwater flow or irrigation return flow, then which 
authority governs: the definition of CAFO as a point 
source or the exemptions? Under the canon of statutory 
interpretation that the specific governs over the general,231 
the definition of CAFO as a point source should govern, 
because the exemptions of stormwater flow and irrigation 
return flow are general types of agricultural flow, while 
flow from a CAFO is a specific agricultural flow .232 It also 
can be argued that unless flow from CAFOs is covered by 
§301(a), the inclusion of CAFOs in the definition of point 
source has no meaning . This is a weaker argument, how-
ever, because a CAFO would still be a point source if a 
stream flowed through it .
EPA has defined CAFOs in great detail in 40 C .F .R . 
§122 .23 and courts have applied the definition as written . 
To be a CAFO, the operation must contain more than the 
number of animals specified in the regulation . EPA may 
also designate smaller operations as CAFOs if they signifi-
cantly contribute to violations of water quality standards . 
Once it is a CAFO, the point source includes not just the 
feeding operation, but ancillary areas for raising or housing 
the animals and storing or disposing of manure . Thus, dis-
charges from adjacent fields used to spread or store manure 
violate the statute unless performed in compliance with the 
regulations .233 We have already seen that the CWA does 
not regulate CAFOs because they are point sources; they 
must also add pollutants to navigable water in order to be 
regulated . The CAFO must be designed not to discharge 
except as a result of a 25-year, 24-hour storm event and may 
discharge only as a result of such an event . Thus, a prop-
erly designed CAFO violates the statute if it discharges as a 
result of a lesser storm event .234
Mushroom-growing operations, like CAFOs, often dis-
pose of their wastewater by spraying it on adjacent fields 
as fertilizer . When properly designed and applied, it does 
not escape into adjacent waterways . If it is overapplied, or 
applied using improperly designed or deteriorated reten-
tion facilities, it may flow into such waterways . When it 
does so without or in violation of a permit, it violates the 
statute .235 One court remarked on the similarity of the 
231 . William N . Eskridge Jr ., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 324 
(1994); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A . Garner, Reading Law 183-89 
(2012) .
232 . Community Ass’n for Restoration of Env’t v . Henry Bosma Dairy, 305 F .3d 
943, 955 (9th Cir . 2002) (“because the farm itself falls within the definition 
of CAFO and is not subject to the agricultural exemption”) .
233 . Id .
234 . Carr v . Alta Verde Indus ., Inc ., 931 F .2d 1055, 1059-60, 21 ELR 21005 
(5th Cir . 1991) .
235 . Reynolds v . Rick’s Mushroom Serv ., Inc ., 246 F . Supp . 2d 449, 457 (E .D . 
Pa . 2003) (“point source” was the entire control system consisting of “land 
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mushroom-growing control system to CAFO control sys-
tems and that used to collect and contain mining waste in 
Earth Sciences.236
Fish-raising facilities are analogous to CAFOs and are 
regulated similarly . EPA defines point source to include 
a “concentrated aquatic animal production facility” by 
producing designated numbers and weights of fish raised, 
and provides that the Agency may designate a smaller 
operation as a point source if it contributes significantly 
to a violation of water quality standards .237 Where a fish 
hatchery is below the size designated as a point source 
in the regulation, it is not a point source unless so des-
ignated by EPA because the operation significantly con-
tributes to violations of water quality standards .238 The 
definition includes operations raising cold water fish 
in “ponds, raceways, or other similar structures which 
discharge at least 30 days a year .”239 The Agency inter-
prets that to include offshore net pen operations raising 
salmon, and its interpretation has been upheld by at least 
one court .240 While CAFO discharges are usually of pol-
luted stormwater and mushroom-growing discharges 
may be of polluted stormwater, fish-raising operation dis-
charges are not of polluted stormwater .
V. Conclusion
The statutory definition of point source is the most detailed 
and complex of the definitions of the elements of the water 
pollution offense . But the interpretation of point source 
is complicated by the statutory juxtaposition of the term 
with nonpoint source and the statutory failure to define 
nonpoint source or to draw a bright line between the two 
terms . The statutory history adds to the complication by 
suggesting that the presence of precipitation runoff is the 
signature of nonpoint sources, a false suggestion if the run-
off is collected and channeled by human activity . Adding 
to the confusion is the tendency of courts and EPA to con-
flate point source and nonpoint source with other elements 
of the offense, such as by referring to a “point source pollut-
ant .” (As mentioned at the beginning of this Article, “pol-
lutant” is a separate element of the §301(a) offense .) Despite 
these complications, in most cases, the determination of 
whether there is a point source is easy because there is an 
obvious “discernible, confined and discrete conveyance” 
and it is often one of the examples listed in the statutory 
definition, such as a pipe .
At this point, the CWA robustly regulates most dis-
charges of pollutants by point sources, but depends on state 
gradations, berms  .  .  . , sedimentation basin, the wastewater impoundment, 
and the sprayer system”); United States v . Oxford Royal Mushroom Prods ., 
Inc ., 487 F . Supp . 852, 854, 10 ELR 20549 (E .D . Pa . 1980) (overapplica-
tion and escape through a break in a berm) .
236 . Rick’s Mushroom Serv ., 246 F . Supp . 2d at 456-577 .
237 . 40 C .F .R . §122 .24 & app . C .
238 . Wild Fish Conservancy v . Quilcene Nat’l Fish Hatchery, 2009 WL 3380655 
(W .D . Wash . 2009) .
239 . 40 C .F .R . §122 .24(a) .
240 . U .S . Public Interest Research Grp . v . Atlantic Salmon of Maine, LLC, 215 
F .2d 239, 32 ELR 20535 (D . Me . 2002) .
regulation of discharges of pollutants by nonpoint sources . 
For the most part, however, such state regulation is neither 
pervasive nor robust and most continuing water pollution 
problems can be traced primarily to nonpoint sources . The 
legislative history of the CWA suggested that relatively 
unregulated nonpoint sources should become robustly 
regulated point sources over time as national uniform 
standards became available to control water pollution from 
them . EPA has not expanded the definition of point source 
to accomplish this objective . The Agency should begin to 
do so . Interpreting and applying the term would be easier 
if EPA amended its regulatory definition of point source 
to incorporate what case law and the Agency’s own prac-
tice have established . Distinguishing point from nonpoint 
sources would also be easier if EPA promulgated a regula-
tory definition of nonpoint source .
The following suggested definitions summarize the 
results of this Article’s analysis:
Nonpoint source means conveyances adding pollut-
ants to the waters of the United States for which con-
veyances are either: (1)  indiscernible, unconfined, and 
indiscrete; or (2) not the result of human activity, in whole 
or in part . Note: Every five years, EPA will review cat-
egories of nonpoint sources to determine if cost-effective 
technology has become available to treat pollutants dis-
charged by any such category and to add to the list of 
point sources in the definition of point source in this sec-
tion any category of nonpoint source for which such tech-
nology has become available .
Point source means any discernible, confined, discrete 
conveyance, resulting in whole or in part from human 
activity, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, chan-
nel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, roll-
ing stock, CAFO, landfill leachate collection system, or 
vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are 
or may be discharged . The term includes human beings 
deliberately discharging pollutants produced in the course 
of a waste-generating activity and devices collecting and 
channeling stormwater, but does not include devices chan-
neling agricultural stormwater, return flow from irrigated 
agriculture, or runoff from roads, except as regulated under 
CWA §402(p) . In determining whether a conveyance is a 
point source, the following factors should be taken into 
account: (1) human activity collects and channels flow to 
navigable waters; (2) there is a single source of pollutants, 
rather than multiple or dispersed sources; (3) the convey-
ance is systematic; and (4) the activity producing the pol-
lutants is susceptible to end-of-pipe treatment technology 
with numerical effluent limitations rather than by best 
management practices .
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Table A 
Decisions Interpreting “Point Source”
U.S. Supreme Court Decisions
1. Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center, 133 S. Ct. 1326, 43 ELR 20062 (2013)
2. South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, 541 U.S. 95, 34 ELR 20021 (2004)
U.S. Court of Appeals Decisions
3. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 673 F.3d 880, 41 ELR 20109 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d on other 
grounds, 133 S. Ct. 710 (2013)
4. Northwest Environmental Defense Center v. Brown, 640 F.3d 1063, 41 ELR 20178 (9th Cir. 2011)
5. National Pork Producers’ Council v. U.S. EPA, 635 F.3d 738, 41 ELR 20115 (5th Cir. 2011)
6. Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Lewis, 628 F.3d 1143, 41 ELR 20059 (9th Cir. 2010)
7. United States v. Agosto-Vegas, 617 F.3d 541, 40 ELR 20222 (1st Cir. 2010)
8. Peconic Baykeeper, Inc. v. Suffolk County, 600 F.3d 180, 40 ELR 20098 (2d Cir. 1010)
9. Cordiano v. Metacon Gun Club, 575 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2009)
10. National Cotton Council v. U.S. EPA, 553 F.3d 927, 39 ELR 20006 (6th Cir. 2009)
11. Oregon Natural Desert Association v. U.S. Forest Service, 550 F.3d 778, 39 ELR 20297 (9th Cir. 2008)
12. United States v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316, 38 ELR 20041 (5th Cir. 2008)
13. United States v. Gerke Excavation, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 36 ELR 20200 (7th Cir. 2006)
14. Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc., 421 F.3d 1133, 35 ELR 20175 (10th Cir. 2005)
15. United States v. Gerke Construction, Inc., 412 F.3d 804 (5th Cir. 2005), judgment vacated on other grounds, 548 U.S. 901 (2006)
16. Parker v. Scrap Metals Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 34 ELR 20104 (11th Cir. 2004)
17. League of Wilderness Defenders v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2002)
18. Community Association for Restoration of the Environment v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 305 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2002)
19. Fishermen Against Destruction of the Environment v. Closter Farms, Inc., 300 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002)
20. Association to Protect Hammersley, Eld, & Totten Inlets v. Taylor Resources, Inc., 299 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002)
21. Borden Ranch Partnership v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 261 F.3d 810, 32 ELR 20011 (9th Cir. 2001), aff ’d without opinion, 
537 U.S. 99 (2002)
22. Froebel v. Meyer, 217 F.3d 928, 30 ELR 20746 (7th Cir. 2000)
23. United States v. West Indies Transportation, Inc., 127 F.3d 299, 28 ELR 20202 (3d Cir. 1997)
24. Concerned Area Residents for the Environment v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114, 24 ELR 21480 (2d Cir. 1994)
25. Committee to Save Mokelumne River v. East Bay Municipal Utility District, 13 F.3d 305, 24 ELR 20225 (9th Cir. 1993)
26. United States v. Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc., 3 F.3d 643, 23 ELR 21526 (2d Cir. 1993)
27. Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 21 ELR 21133 (2d Cir. 1991)
28. Carr v. Alta Verde Industries, Inc., 931 F.2d 1055, 21 ELR 21005 (5th Cir. 1991)
29. Trustees for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549, 15 ELR 20146 (9th Cir. 1984)
30. Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 13 ELR 20942 (5th Cir. 1983)
31. National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 13 ELR 20015 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
32. Missouri ex rel. Ashcroft v. Department of Army, 672 F.2d 1297, 12 ELR 20368 (8th Cir. 1982)
33. Sierra Club v. Abston Construction Co., Inc., 620 F.2d 41, 10 ELR 20552 (5th Cir. 1980)
34. United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 9 ELR 20542 (10th Cir. 1979)
35. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 8 ELR 20028 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
36. Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 6 ELR 20732 (4th Cir. 1976)
U.S. District Court Decisions
37. Assateague Coastkeeper v. Hudson Farm, 727 F. Supp. 2d 433, 40 ELR 20208 (D. Md. 2010)
38. United States v. Righter, 2010 WL 2640189 (M.D. Pa. 2010)
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39. National Association of Homebuilders v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 699 F. Supp. 2d 209, 40 ELR 20104 (D.D.C. 2010), 
vacated on other grounds, 663 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
40. Ogeechee-Canooche Riverkeeper, Inc. v. T.C. Logging, Inc., 2009 WL 2390851 (S.D. Ga. 2009)
41. West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Huffman, 2009 WL 2705854, 39 ELR 20201 (S.D. W. Va. 2009), aff ’d, 625 F.3d 159, 40 
ELR 20014 (4th Cir. 2010)
42. Wild Fish Conservancy v. Quilcene National Fish Hatchery, 2009 WL 3380655 (W.D. Wash. 2009)
43. United States v. Acquest Transit, LLC, 2009 WL 2157005 (W.D.N.Y. 2009)
44. Environmental Protection Information Center v. Pacific Lumber Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 803, 37 ELR 20012 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
45. United States v. Lippold, 2007 WL 3232483 (C.D. Ill. 2007)
46. North Carolina Shellfish Growers Ass’n v. Holly Ridge Associates, 278 F. Supp. 2d 654 (E.D.N.C. 2003)
47. Reynolds v. Rick’s Mushroom Service, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 2d 449 (E.D. Pa. 2003)
48. U.S. Public Interest Research Group. v. Atlantic Salmon of Maine, LLC, 215 F. Supp. 2d 239, 32 ELR 20535 (D. Me. 2002)
49. U.S. EPA ex rel. McKeown v. Port Authority of N.Y. & N.J., 162 F. Supp. 2d 173 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff ’d sub nom. McKeown v. 
Delaware Bridge Authority, 23 F. App’x 81 (2d Cir. 2001)
50. Stone v. Naperville Park District, 38 F. Supp. 2d 651 (N.D. Ill. 1999)
51. Froebel v. Meyer, 13 F. Supp. 2d 843 (E.D. Wis. 1998)
52. Williams Pipe Line Co. v. Bayer Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1300 (S.D. Iowa 1997)
53. RSR Corp. v. Browner, 924 F. Supp. 504, 26 ELR 21353 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
54. United States v. Lambert, 915 F. Supp. 797, 26 ELR 21116 (S.D. W. Va. 1996)
55. Hudson Riverkeeper Fund, Inc. v. Harbor at Hastings Associates, 917 F. Supp. 251, 26 ELR 21120 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
56. Long Island Soundkeeper Fund, Inc. v. New York Athletic Club, 1996 WL 131863 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
57. Beartooth Alliance v. Crown Butte Mines, 904 F. Supp. 1168, 26 ELR 20639 (D. Mont. 1995)
58. Molokai Chamber of Commerce v. Kukui, 891 F. Supp. 1389, 26 ELR 20303 (D. Haw. 1995)
59. Washington Wilderness Coalition v. Hecla Mining Co., 870 F. Supp. 983, 25 ELR 20661 (E.D. Wash. 1994)
60. United States v. Villegas, 784 F. Supp. 6, 22 ELR 21027 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), rev’d sub nom. United States v. Plaza Health Laborato-
ries, Inc., 3 F.3d 643, 23 ELR 21526 (2d Cir. 1993)
61. United States v. Sinclair Oil, 767 F. Supp. 200, 21 ELR 21323 (D. Mont. 1990)
62. Friends of the Sakonnet v. Dutra, 738 F. Supp. 623, 21 ELR 20055 (D.R.I. 1990)
63. National Wildlife Federation v. Consumers Power Co., 657 F. Supp. 1007 (W.D. Mich. 1987), rev’d on other grounds, 862 F.2d 
580 (6th Cir. 1988)
64. Fishel v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 640 F. Supp. 442, 16 ELR 20634 (M.D. Pa. 1986)
65. O’Leary v. Moyer’s Landfill, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 642, 12 ELR 20239 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
66. United States v. Weisman, 489 F. Supp. 1331, 10 ELR 20698 (M.D. Fla. 1980)
67. United States v. Oxford Royal Mushroom Products, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 952, 10 ELR 20549 (E.D. Pa. 1980)
68. Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646 (D.P.R. 1979), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Weinberger v. Barcelo-Romero, 643 
F.2d 835, 11 ELR 20391 (1st Cir. 1981), rev’d on other grounds, 456 U.S. 305, 12 ELR 20538 (1982)
69. South Carolina Wildlife Federation v. Alexander, 457 F. Supp. 118, 8 ELR 20757 (D.S.C. 1978)
70. Mahelona v. Hawaiian Electric Co., Inc., 418 F. Supp. 1328, 7 ELR 20031 (D. Haw. 1976)
71. United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 4 ELR 20710 (M.D. Fla. 1974)
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a. Plus (+) denotes an expansive interpretation of point source; minus (-) denotes a restrictive interpretation. Note that even though the interpretation of 
point source may be expansive, the environmental party may have lost the case for other reasons.
b. Canons used to interpret point source: (1) precedent; (2) broad interpretation to achieve statutory purpose; (3) legislative history; (4) deference; (5) plain 
meaning; (6) structure of statute; (7) harmonize with other statutes; (8) avoid absurd results; (9) avoid constitutional issues; (10) interpret exceptions nar-
rowly; (11) honor federalism; (12) exception proves the rule; (13) give every word meaning; (14) interpret waivers narrowly (finality); (15) inclusiveness of 
definition; (16) exclusiveness of definition; (17) equity; (18) avoid administrative difficulties; (19) inclusion of one implies exclusion of another; (20) rule of 
lenity; (21) ejusdem generis; and (22) rule of the last antecedent.
c. Cit. S. means citizen suit; Crim. means criminal prosecution; Enf. means civil enforcement; Jud. Rev. means judicial review.
d. Decisions Cited refers only to Supreme Court or lower federal court precedent interpreting point source.
Table B
Analysis of Decisions Interpreting Point Source
Decision 
Number
Year +/-a Type of Caseb Canons Used Number of 
Canons Usedc
Number of 
Decisions Citedd
CWA § 
U.S. Supreme Court Decisions
1. 2013 - Cit. S. 4, 5, 6, 22 4 -- 402
2. 2004 + Cit. S. 2, 5, 21 3 -- 402
U.S. Court of Appeals Decisions
3. 2011 + Cit. S. 1, 5, 6 3 4 402
4. 2011 - Cit. S. 1, 3, 5, 6 4 4 402
5. 2011 - Jud. Rev. 1, 5 2 4 402
6. 2010 + Cit. S. 1, 5 2 3 402
7. 2010 + Crim. 5 1 -- 402
8. 2010 + Cit. S. 1, 2, 5 3 3 402
9. 2009 - Cit. S. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 5 7 402
10. 2009 + Jud. Rev. 1, 2, 5, 6 4 4 402
11. 2008 - Cit. S. 1, 6 2 3 402
12. 2008 + Crim. 1, 3, 5 3 6 402
13. 2005 + Crim. 1 1 4 404
14. 2005 + Cit. S. 1, 4, 5, 6 4 5 402
15. 2005 + Enf. 1 1 4 404
16. 2004 + Cit. S. 1, 2 2 2 402
17. 2002 - Cit. S. 1, 4, 5, 13, 22 5 2 402
18. 2002 + Cit. S. 1, 2 2 2 402
19. 2002 + Cit. S. 1, 5 3 2 402
20. 2002 - Cit. S. 1 1 1 402
21. 2001 + Jud. Rev./Enf. 1, 2 2 1 404
22. 2000 - Cit. S. 1, 5 2 5 402/404
23. 1997 + Crim. 1, 2, 5 3 5 402
24. 1994 + Cit. S. 1, 2, 4, 5 4 7 402
25. 1993 + Cit. S. 1, 5 2 2 402
26. 1993 - Crim. 1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 13, 20, 21 8 7 402
27. 1991 + Cit. S. 1, 2, 14 3 3 402
28. 1991 + Cit. S. 5 1 -- 402
29. 1984 + Jud. Rev. 1, 3, 6 3 2 402
30. 1983 + Cit. S. 1, 5 2 2 402
31. 1982 - Cit. S. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 18 6 1 402
32. 1982 - Cit. S. 5 1 -- 402
33. 1980 + Cit. S. 1, 5 2 2 402
34. 1979 + Enf. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 10 6 2 402
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Decision 
Number
Year +/-a Type of Caseb Canons Used Number of 
Canons Usedc
Number of 
Decisions Citedd
CWA § 
35. 1977 + Jud. Rev. 1, 3, 5, 6, 18 5 1 402
36. 1976 - Jud. Rev. 5, 6 2 -- 402
U.S. District Court Decisions
37. 2010 + Cit. S. 5 1 402
38. 2010 + Jud. Rev. 1, 6, 8 3 8 404
39. 2010 + Enf. 1, 5 2 1 404
40. 2009 - Cit. S. 1, 4 2 1 402
41. 2009 + Cit. S. 1, 5 2 2 404
42. 2009 + Cit. S. 1, 4, 5, 8, 13 5 2 402
43. 2009 + Enf. 15 1 5 404
44. 2008 -- Cit. S. 1 1 9 402
45. 2007 + Cit. S. 1, 2, 5 3 7 402
46. 2003 + Cit. S. 1, 5 2 5 402/404
47. 2003 + Cit. S. 1, 2, 4 3 3 402
48. 2002 + Cit. S. 1, 2, 4, 5 4 8 402
49. 2001 - Cit. S. 1, 7, 16, 21 4 5 402
50. 1999 + Cit. S. 1, 5 2 1 402
51. 1998 -- Cit. S. 1, 6 2 2 402/404
52. 1997 + Cit. S. 1, 8 2 3 402
53. 1996 + Jud. Rev. 1, 2, 6 3 4 402
54. 1996 + Crim. 1 1 1 404
55. 1996 - Cit. S. 1, 16 2 2 402
56. 1996 + Cit. S. 1, 2 2 8 402
57. 1995 + Cit. S. 1, 2, 4 3 2 402
58. 1995 + Cit. S. 1, 5 2 1 402
59. 1994 + Cit. S. 1, 2, 4 3 8 402
60. 1991 + Crim. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 15, 21 9 5 402
61. 1990 + Enf. 1 1 3 404
62. 1990 - Cit. S. 1, 2, 4, 8 4 3 402
63. 1987 + Cit. S. 1,5 2 2 402
64. 1986 + Cit. S. 1, 2 2 4 402
65. 1981 + Cit. S. 1, 5 2 3 402
66. 1980 + Enf. 1, 5 2 1 404
67. 1980 + Crim. 1, 5, 6 3 1 402
68. 1979 + Cit. S. 1, 5 2 2 402
69. 1978 + Cit. S. 1, 5 2 1 402
70. 1976 + Cit. S. 4, 6 2 -- NEPA
71. 1974 + Enf. 5 1 -- 402
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